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WHOSE PRECAUTION AFTER ALL?
A COMMENT ON THE COMPARISON AND
EVOLUTION OF RISK REGULATORY
SYSTEMS*
JONATHAN B. WIENER**
I. INTRODUCTION
A century ago, Oscar Wilde spun the story of the Canterville
Ghost, who haunts a stately British manor and terrifies its European
denizens, rattling chains at night and leaving bloodstains on the car-
pet.1  But the Otis family arrives from America and buys Canterville
Chase, undaunted by the ghost.  Scoffs Mr. Otis upon purchasing the
manor: “I will take the furniture and the ghost at a valuation.  I come
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Above all I owe thanks to my late colleague Herbert Bernstein, who was an exceedingly
kind and generous guide to a young newcomer at Duke.  More than that, I saw in him the empa-
thy of a parallel life.  As he was growing up in Germany in the 1930s, my mother was growing up
in Vienna.  Both survived the war (she was smuggled out of Austria at age 8 in 1938, just after
the Anschluss) and found a new life in America.  I suppose my interest in comparing U.S. and
European regulatory systems derives in part from my personal ties to Europe.  Certainly my
interest in European law was much encouraged by Herbert.
1. Oscar Wilde, The Canterville Ghost, COURT AND SOCIETY REVIEW, Feb. 23, 1887, re-
printed in OSCAR WILDE, LORD ARTHUR SAVILE’S CRIME AND OTHER PROSE PIECES (1908),
reprinted in 9 THE FIRST COLLECTED EDITION OF THE WORKS OF OSCAR WILDE, 1908–1922,
at  65–119 (Robert B. Ross ed. 1969).
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from a modern country, where we have everything that money can
buy; and with all our spry young fellows painting the Old World red,
and carrying off your best actors and prima–donnas, I reckon that if
there were such a thing as a ghost in Europe, we’d have it at home in
a very short time in one of our public museums, or on the road as a
show.”2  The ghost does his best to frighten the Otises, but they non-
chalantly barrage the ghost with American technology, commercial-
ism, and fearlessness.3  When the ghost rattles at the bedroom door in
the middle of the night, Mr. Otis springs up, shoves into the ghost’s
skeletal hands a bottle of Tammany Rising Sun Lubricator, brightly
advises the ghost to use the oil to stop those chains from squeaking,
and calmly returns to bed.4  Mr. Otis also applies Pinkerton’s Cham-
pion Stain Remover and Paragon Detergent to remove the bloodstain
in the library.5  The Otis children turn the tables on the ghost, devil-
ishly chasing it about the house.6  Unable to scare the Americans, the
European ghost ultimately capitulates and falls on the mercy of the
Otis daughter, who guides his guilty soul to a final resting place where
his haunting days can end.7
How far has comparative law progressed since Wilde’s day?
Like Wilde's satire, modern comparisons of risk regulation in the
United States and Europe are often cast in stereotypes.  They depict
Europeans as risk-averse, afraid of the unknown (the ghost in the
dark), afraid of new technologies (especially American) and of global
markets, jumping to adopt precautionary regulations against the most
remote and speculative risks.  Meanwhile Americans are seen as risk–
indifferent or even risk–preferring, blustering blithely past risks (real
and imagined), confident that new technology (Pinkerton's Champion
this or that) and the power of (American) markets will solve every
problem and that precaution is a waste of time and a hindrance to
progress.
As Herbert Bernstein would have told us, these are stereotypes,
fit for an Oscar Wilde comedy, not for serious analyses of compara-
tive law.  In this article, I echo Herbert's admonition to those who
would paint stark contrasts between American and European legal
2. Id. at 66.
3. See id. at 69–73.
4. Id. at 75.
5. Id. at 70.
6. See id.at 80–82.
7. See id. at 102–114.
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systems based only on a few data points.8  As Herbert said, what we
need more than abstract claims is “hard–nosed comparative work on
clearly defined specific institutions or subject–matter areas.”9
I argue in this article that despite some divisive rhetoric of late,
U.S. and European systems of risk regulation are not divergent in the
simple way in which they are claimed to be.  Part I documents the
claim of divergence and greater European precaution.  Part II argues
that, instead, U.S. and European risk regulatory systems diverge in
some ways, converge in others, and display a complex pattern of in-
teraction.  Both the United States and Europe have quite active envi-
ronmental regulatory systems; the United States has hardly ceased
regulating.  Both the United States and Europe are often highly pre-
cautionary—and on several prominent examples, including particu-
late air pollution, mad cow disease in blood, youth violence, and ter-
rorism, it is the United States that is acting in the more precautionary
manner.  The United States and Europe do not diverge as much as is
claimed on the general use of precaution in regulation, but they often
do diverge on the particular question of which risks to worry about
and regulate most.  This particularized divergence gives rise to visible
conflicts.  Part III considers the methods and challenges of compara-
tive law and argues that the broader reality in transatlantic risk regu-
lation is a process of “hybridization,” in which both systems borrow
legal concepts from each other in a complex and continuous mutual
evolution.10  Part IV offers concluding thoughts.
II. THE CLAIM OF GREATER EUROPEAN PRECAUTION
The conventional wisdom today is that European regulatory law
has, since roughly the late 1980s, become “more precautionary” than
U.S. regulatory law.  The United States and the European Union
8. See Bernstein, supra note *, at 588, 589, 591 (criticizing work drawing stark contrasts
between American and European law for relying on “erroneous information” and adopting
“completely misguided” stereotypical assumptions that are “grotesque misconceptions”).
9.  Herbert L. Bernstein, Comparative Law, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 261 (1992) (reviewing
BERNHARD GROßFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (1990)).
10.   This article draws on Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precau-
tion in the United States and Europe, 5  J. RISK RES. 317 (2002), available at http://www.env.
duke.edu/solutions/precaution_project.html#Publications (analyzing versions of the Precaution-
ary Principle, comparing American and European regulation, and testing hypotheses to explain
the observed pattern); and Jonathan B. Wiener, Convergence, Divergence and Complexity in
U.S. and European Risk Regulation, in GREEN GIANTS?: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE
U.S. AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Norman Vig & Michael Faure eds. forthcoming 2003), avail-
able at http://www.law.duke.edu:9000/fac/facpub.html (developing a model of hybridization to
account for U.S. and European regulatory evolution).
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(EU) have recently clashed over the regulation of a number of health
and environmental risks, from genetically modified (GM) foods to
climate change to hormones in beef.  In each of these three cases,
Europe has sought more stringent measures to prevent uncertain
risks of future harm, citing the “Precautionary Principle” as its justifi-
cation11; and in each of these cases, the United States has demurred.
As to hormones in beef and GM foods, the United States sued the
EU in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  As to climate change,
President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol but would not submit it
to the U.S. Senate for ratification, and President Bush later withdrew
from the Kyoto negotiations entirely.
More generally, observers cite the emphasis placed by U.S.
Presidents since Jimmy Carter on cost–benefit analysis of new regula-
tions, the increasing influence of environmental organizations and
parties in European regulatory politics, and the growing role of
11. There is no single accepted version of the Precautionary Principle (PP).  One author
catalogues 19 different interpretations.  See Per Sandin, Dimensions of the Precautionary Princi-
ple, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 889 (1999).  I speak of precaution as a continu-
ous variable, with policies being “more precautionary” where they act earlier and more strin-
gently to forestall an uncertain future risk.  In its most basic narrative form, the PP is a principle
that permits precautionary action (regulation) to prevent an uncertain future risk in advance of
complete evidence about the risk.  For example: “Where there are threats of serious or irre-
versible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustain-
able Development in the ECE Region, Article 7, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/10, in 1 Yearbook
of International Environmental Law 429 (1990).  This version is unobjectionable but not very
helpful to decisionmaking.  There is never “full scientific certainty”; we always face uncertainty,
and we must always make decisions under uncertainty.  This version of the PP does not answer
the real question: what action to take, given the risks, costs, and inevitable uncertainties.  Other
versions of the PP are more aggressive, going so far as to forbid the potentially risky activity un-
til the proponent of the activity demonstrates that it passes a specified standard such as no
harm, safety, or acceptable risk.  For example: “As described in the Wingspread Statement on
the Precautionary Principle, the applicant or proponent of an activity or process or chemical
needs to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the public and the regulatory community that the
environment and public health will be safe.  The proof must shift to the party or entity that will
benefit from the activity and that is most likely to have the information.”  Wingspread State-
ment on the Precautionary Principle, January 25, 1998, reprinted in PROTECTING PUBLIC
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 353
(Carolyn Raffensperger and Joel Tickner eds. 1999).  See also THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 265 (David Freestone & Ellen Hey eds. 1996) (analyz-
ing the PP as shifting the burden of proof and setting a standard of proof).  This version could
be excessively stringent, depending on the standard that must be met; a requirement that no ac-
tivity proceed unless its proponents can show it would cause “no harm” would be tantamount to
a ban.  Such a standard could not be met by any activity, including medicine, manufacturing, and
indeed precautionary regulation itself (which may reduce the target risk but create new coun-
tervailing risks).  See Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in HUMAN AND
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509–1531 (Dennis J. Paustenbach
ed. 2002) (hereinafter Wiener, Multirisk World).
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European institutions borne of European integration in the 1990s.12
These are clearly important developments; European environmental
policy is evolving, and the United States can learn much from the
emerging European policy experience.
The Precautionary Principle is frequently advocated to justify
and mobilize anticipatory regulation of uncertain risks.13  The notion
of precautionary regulation is not new; prominent endorsements have
appeared in both Europe and the United States since at least the
1970s.  The cognate concept of vorsorgeprinzip in German law dates
at least to the early 1970s.14  In the United States, landmark cases such
as Ethyl Corp. v. EPA15 and TVA v. Hill16 vindicated the notion of
precautionary regulation under the Clean Air Act and the Endan-
gered Species Act, respectively; and pre-market safety review of new
drugs under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has an even
older pedigree.17  U.S. law has frequently adopted precautionary ap-
proaches, though no generic principle of precaution.18
In recent years the ambition of precaution as an overarching
“principle” to govern all risk regulation has grown.  It is paid homage
in several important international agreements, including several trea-
ties on Marine Pollution, the Rio Declaration, the Framework Con-
      12.  See Ludwig Kraemer, Development of Environmental Policies in the US and Europe:
Convergence or Divergence?  in GREEN GIANTS? ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (Norman J. Vig & Michael G. Faure eds. forthcoming
2003) (arguing that since the early 1980s, European environmental law has become more pre-
cautionary because of the increasing integration of E.U. institutions coupled with a commitment
to precaution and to the environment as a fundamental value, whereas U.S. environmental law
has become less precautionary because of increasing use of cost-benefit analysis, risk assess-
ment, and economic considerations); Theofanis Christoforou, The Precautionary Principle, Risk
Assessment, and the Comparative Role of Science in the European Community and the United
States Legal Systems, in GREEN GIANTS, supra (arguing that Europe favors the precautionary
principle while the U.S. favors risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis).  Messrs. Kraemer and
Christoforou are senior attorneys at the European Commission.
13.  See, e.g., James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Funda-
mental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 1 (1991).
14.  See  Sonja Boehmer-Christiansen, The Precautionary Principle in Germany—Enabling
Government, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 31, 33 (Tim O’Riordan &
James Cameron eds., 1994) (describing the advance of “vorsorgeprinzip,” or the principle of
foresight and caution, in Germany in the 1970s).
15.  541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
16.  437 U.S. 153 (1978).
17. Federal Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, § 1, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by
Section 902(a) of Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1059 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 301).
18.  See John Appelgate, The Precautionary Preference: An American Perspective on the
Precautionary Principle, 6 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 413 (2000).
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vention on Climate Change, the Cartagena Protocol on BioSafety,
and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
(POPs).19  The treaties that constitute the EU expressly provide that
EU environmental policy shall be “based on the precautionary prin-
ciple.”20  The European Commission has formally articulated and en-
dorsed the Precautionary Principle,21 and the European Environment
Agency has published a book on the advantages of precaution.22  Pro-
ponents have forecast that it “could become the fundamental princi-
ple of environmental protection policy and law.”23  Some assert that
the Precautionary Principle may already be so widely adopted that it
is ripening into an enforceable norm of customary international law,
from which no nation can dissent.24
The United States, however, has not officially adopted the Pre-
cautionary Principle as a general basis for all risk regulation.  After
initial endorsements of precautionary regulation in the 1970s cases
like Ethyl Corp. and TVA v. Hill, in 1980 the U.S. Supreme Court
held in the Benzene case25 that OSHA cannot regulate on the basis of
mere conjecture about uncertain risks; the court ruled that the agency
19.  E.g., the Rio Declaration, Article 15; United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), art. 3.3.  See
NICOLAS DE SADELEER, ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES: FROM POLITICAL SLOGANS TO
LEGAL RULES 94-100 (2002); Daniel Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary
Principle, ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1991,at 4; Ellen Hey, The Precautionary Concept in Environ-
mental Policy and Law: Institutionalizing Caution, 4 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 303 (1992).
20.  TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct.
2, 1997 O.J. (C 340) art. 174 (formerly Single European Act, Article 130R (1987)), reprinted as
EUROPEAN UNION: CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION AND
CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 37
I.L.M. 56, 116–117 (1998).
21.  Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on
the Precautionary Principle, COM(2000)1, Brussels, Feb. 2, 2000, available at http://europa.eu.
int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub07_en.pdf (hereinafter Communication on the
Precautionary Principle).
22.  European Environment Agency (EEA), Late Lessons from Early Warnings: The Pre-
cautionary Principle 1896–2000, Environmental Issue Report No. 22 (Luxembourg: Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001).
23.  Cameron & Abouchar, supra note 13, at 2 (emphasis in original).
24.  See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 212–13
(1995) (advocating adoption of the Precautionary Principle as an enforceable norm of custom-
ary international law).  See also Peter H. Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Per-
spective, 6 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 445, 448 (2000) (noting that the Supreme
Court of India has deemed the Precautionary Principle to be an enforceable norm of customary
international law) (hereinafter Sands, Precautionary Principle).
25.   Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607
(1980) (hereinafter Benzene).
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must demonstrate “significant risk” before regulating.26  This decision,
and a 1983 guidebook from the National Academy of Sciences,
spurred widespread adoption of scientific risk assessment as the basis
for American risk regulation over the past two decades, while Euro-
pean regulation has remained more qualitative and informal.27  Later,
the United States insisted on qualifying the statement of the Precau-
tionary Principle in the Climate Change Treaty,28 and the United
States responded to the European Commission’s recent endorsement
of the Precautionary Principle with a long list of skeptical questions.29
Today, the conventional wisdom is that Europe endorses the
Precautionary Principle and seeks proactively to regulate risks, while
the United States opposes the Precautionary Principle and waits more
circumspectly for evidence of actual harm before regulating.30  In 1999
the Trade Commissioner of the European Union, Pascal Lamy, as-
serted that “in the U.S. they believe that if no risks have been proven
about a product, it should be allowed.  In the EU we believe some-
26. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 655.
27.  See SHEILA JASANOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE (1986);
SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR (1995); Sheila Jasanoff, Contingent Knowledge: Im-
plications for Implementation and Compliance, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 63 (Edith Brown Weiss &
Harold K. Jacobson eds. 1998).
28.  See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 849 (entered into force March 21, 1994), Article 3.3.  The United States initially resisted
this provision and then secured addition of the words “cost-effective” as well as accompanying
discussion of the “comprehensive approach” and other matters.  See Daniel Bodansky, The
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L.
451, 503–504 (1993).
29. U.S. Department of State, Questions from the United States on the Commission’s
Communication on the Precautionary Principle, March 2000 (copy on file with author) (ques-
tioning, inter alia, the terms, scope and enforceability  of the precautionary principle under
European and international law).
30.  See, e.g., Kraemer, supra note 12; Christoforou, supra note 12; Stephan-Gotz Richter,
The U.S. Consumer’s Friend, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at A31 (lauding “the advantages of
European intervention in everything from . . . antitrust policy to food safety” and charging that
“the American government is inclined toward allowing industry to regulate itself”); David L.
Levy & Peter Newell, Oceans Apart?  Business Responses to Global Environmental Issues in
Europe and the United States, ENVIRONMENT, Nov. 2000, at 9, 10 (describing the “conventional
wisdom” that “Europeans demonstrate their considerable concern about environmental issues”
while “people in the United States are more individualistic, more concerned about their life-
styles than about the environment, and more ideologically averse to regulation.”) (internal cita-
tion omitted); Willett Kempton & Paul P. Craig, European Perspectives on Global Climate
Change, ENVIRONMENT, April 1993, at 16–20, 41–45 (arguing that Europeans are more con-
cerned than are Americans about environmental impacts on future generations and on devel-
oping countries and more likely to invoke caution regarding unforeseen risks and that Ameri-
cans are more concerned about the economic costs of regulation and more optimistic about
future technological solutions to environmental problems).
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thing should not be authorized if there is a chance of risk.”31  Fifteen
years ago, comparisons of U.S. and European regulation found dif-
ferent procedural approaches but similar degrees of regulatory strin-
gency.32  Nowadays, mixing the new conventional wisdom with a more
nuanced view, leading scholars of comparative regulation describe a
“flip-flop:” they argue that the United States was more precautionary
than Europe in the 1970s, but Europe has become more precaution-
ary than the United States since the 1990s.33  Echoing that view, a
senior environmental official of the European Commission said that
the United States “was definitely leading European policy back in the
1970s and early 1980s,” but now “Europe has certainly managed to
catch up” and on some issues “has taken over the role as world
leader.”34  David Vogel writes: “from the 1960s through the mid
1980s, the regulation of health, safety and environmental risks was
generally stricter in the United States than Europe.  Since the mid
1980s, the obverse has often been the case.”35  He emphasizes that
these trends “have not produced policy convergence.  On the con-
trary, European and American regulatory policies are now as diver-
gent as they were three decades ago.  What has changed is the direc-
tion of this divergence.  In a number of areas, Europe has become
more risk-averse, America less so.”36
Normative evaluations of this situation vary.  Some observers see
a civilized, safe, careful Europe confronting a risky, reckless, and
31. Steve Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade
Rules, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 271, 295, n.181 (2000).
32. See DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION (1986); JASANOFF, RISK
MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE, supra note 27; RONALD BRICKMAN, SHEILA
JASANOFF & THOMAS ILGEN, , CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATION IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1985).
33.  See Olivier Cadot & David Vogel, France, the United States, and the Biotechnology
Dispute, Brookings Foreign Policy Studies (Jan. 2001), available at http://www.brookings.
edu/fp/cusf/analysis/biotech.htm (last visited March 4, 2003); Diahanna Lynch & David Vogel,
Apples and Oranges: Comparing the Regulation of Genetically Modified Food in Europe and the
United States, paper prepared for the American Political Science Association annual meeting, 31
August–3 September 2000; Ragnar E. Lofstedt & David Vogel, The Changing Character of
Regulation: A Comparison of Europe and the United States, 21 RISK ANALYSIS 399, 401 (June
2001) (dubbing this switch the regulatory “flip-flop”); David Vogel, Ships Passing in the Night:
The Changing Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States, Robert Schuman
Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Working Paper 2001/16, 1 (2001)
(hereinafter Vogel, Ships Passing).
34.  Jorgen Henningsen, The Seven Principles of European Environmental Policies, in
TOWARD A TRANSATLANTIC ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 25-26 (The European Institute, 1992).
35.  Vogel, Ships Passing, supra note 33, at 1.
36.  Id. at 31.
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violent America.37  To this group, the Precautionary Principle is an
antidote to industrialization, globalization, and American risk-taking.
On the other hand, other observers see a fearful, statist, protectionist
Europe trying to rise in the post–Cold War era to challenge a market–
based, scientific, entrepreneurial United States.38  To this group, the
Precautionary Principle is an obstacle to science, trade and progress.
Shades of Oscar Wilde.
III. THE MORE COMPLEX REALITY
The claim of greater European precaution is based on a limited
examination of a few highly visible examples, such as hormones in
beef and genetically modified (GM) foods, plus a set of changes in le-
gal language.  But a broader and more detailed analysis of several
strata of the American and European regulatory systems reveals a
much more complex reality.  By dividing the analysis into eight func-
tional component parts of the regulatory process–(A) framing, (B)
risk assessment methods, (C) risk management standards, (D) choice
of risks to regulate, (E) choice of policy instruments, (F) degree of in-
tegration across hazards and media, (G) enforcement mechanisms,
and (H) hierarchical level of government—one can better appreciate
the multifaceted relations between U.S. and European environmental
policies.  One can see both convergence and divergence, depending
on the component being examined and the degree of magnification or
aggregation.  Overall, as discussed in Part III below, one sees a com-
plex pattern of hybrid evolution.
A. Framing
As noted above in Part I, the EU has advocated the “precaution-
ary principle” in international environmental and trade fora, while
the United States (under Presidents George W. Bush, Bill Clinton
and George H.W. Bush) has consistently expressed reservations.  This
divergence at the level of high rhetoric or issue framing has led to
37.  See Richter, supra note 30; Suzanne Daley, Europe’s Dim View of U.S. Is Evolving
Into Frank Hostility, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 2000, at A1 (citing widespread European fear of the
U.S. as violent—e.g., guns, death penalty; profit-driven; heartless—lets poor go without medical
insurance; and imperialist—forcing its military, culture and products on others); Donald G.
McNeil, Jr., Protests on New Genes and Seeds Grow More Passionate in Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
March 14, 2000, at A1, A10 (quoting Pierre Lellouche, a member of the French Parliament
committee on environmental safety, “The general sense here is that Americans eat garbage
food, that they’re fat and that they don’t know to eat properly.”).
38. See JOHN REDWOOD, STARS AND STRIFE: THE COMING CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE
USA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (2001).
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frequent claims that Europe has become “more precautionary” than
the United States.  This divergence in the rhetorical objectives of en-
vironmental regulation may reflect real differences in regulatory pol-
icy.  Or it may reflect conclusions drawn from a few visible cases such
as GM foods but not a full characterization of the broad array of
regulatory policies.  Or it may reflect exaggerated group contrasts and
perhaps actual group polarization,39 possibly spurred by a new dy-
namic of international rivalry for policy leadership after the end of
the Cold War.40  Given that the United States and Europe are both at
the highly precautionary end of the global spectrum, and given the
findings discussed below of simultaneous actual precaution when
viewed across a broader set of risks, the stark claim of divergence be-
tween European precaution and U.S. policy seems overdrawn—heu-
ristic, symbolic, or normative rather than descriptively accurate.
B. Risk Assessment
At least since the U.S. Supreme Court’s Benzene decision in
1980, it has been observed that the United States takes a more formal
scientific and quantitative approach to risk assessment, while the
European approach is more qualitative.41  Yet there are signs of con-
vergence.  The European Commission espoused scientific risk as-
sessment as a predicate to any invocation of the precautionary princi-
ple,42 and the European Court of Justice held, in a case on mad cow
disease (BSE) quite reminiscent of Benzene, that Member State gov-
ernments may not invoke precaution to regulate risks that the Com-
mission has deemed insignificant.43
39.  See infra Part IV.A.
40.  Ivo H. Daalder, Are the United States and Europe Heading for Divorce?,  77 INT’L AFF.
553-567 (2001); Robert Kagan, Power & Weakness, POL’Y REV. (June 2002), available at
http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan_print.html (last visited March 4, 2003); ROBERT
KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
(2003).
41.  See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
42.  Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the Precautionary
Principle, supra note 21.
43. Case 1/00, Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic (Failure of a
Member State to fulfill its obligations – Refusal to end the ban on British beef and veal), 2001
E.C.R. I-09989 (European Court of Justice, 2001).  The BSE case could also be analogized to
U.S. decisions under the Dormant Commerce Clause, such as City of Philadelphia v. New Jer-
sey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), because France was maintaining a ban on imports of British beef in
violation of the principle of free movement of goods within the Single European Market.  But
the ECJ’s decision recognized that, under the precautionary principle, a member state could
maintain higher food safety standards than those set by the European Commission, if the mem-
ber state had a good reason (cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).  The ECJ’’s decision
8WIENER 09/10/03  4:14 PM
Special Issue 2003] WHOSE PRECAUTION AFTER ALL? 217
On the other hand, in September 2002 the European Court of
First Instance issued decisions in two cases that seem to cut against
the need for a risk assessment prior to adopting a regulation.  In
Pfizer Animal Health S.A. v. Council of the EU,44 the court upheld a
ban on using the antibiotic virginiamycin in animal feed because of
the potential for such use to generate resistant bacteria that could
later infect humans.  On the same day, the Court of First Instance de-
cided Alpharma Inc. v. Council of the EU,45 upholding a ban on the
antibiotic bacitracin zinc in animal feed on similar grounds.  The two
decisions can be read narrowly as exempting this regulation from the
requirement of a risk assessment on the sole ground that the regula-
tion was adopted before the European Commission published its
February 2000 Communication on the Precautionary Principle.46  If
so, then for regulations adopted after February 2000, the criterion of
a risk assessment may be binding.  But the court in Pfizer also ruled
that under the precautionary principle in EC Treaty 174 (formerly
130R), and under Article 11 of Directive 70/524 (which provides that
the Community institutions may withdraw authorization of an addi-
tive in animal feed where use of the additive constitutes “a danger
to . . . human health”), an additive could be banned even when no risk
assessment had been conducted, when there was limited or no evi-
dence of such bacterial resistance arising, when there was no present
need for the use of such antibiotics in human medicine, and when the
European Community's Scientific Committee for Animal Nutrition
(SCAN) had recommended against a ban.  Said the court:
[W]here there is scientific uncertainty as to the existence or extent
of risks to human health, the Community institutions may, by rea-
son of the precautionary principle, take protective measures with-
out having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks
become fully apparent. . . . Thus, in a situation in which the precau-
tionary principle is applied, which by definition coincides with a
turned on whether France’s scientific appraisal of the safety of British beef could overcome the
Commission’s appraisal.  The ECJ held that it could not—that the Commission’s scientific find-
ings overruled those of France.  This conclusion is somewhat striking in light of the Commis-
sion’s Communication on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 21, which says that precau-
tionary action may be based on a minority scientific viewpoint.
44.  Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health S.A. v. Council, 2002 WL 31337 (European Court
of First Instance, Sept. 11, 2002).
45.  Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v. Council, 2002 WL 31338  (European Court of First In-
stance, Sept. 11, 2002).
46.  See Pfizer, ¶ 122; Alpharma Inc. v. Council, 143.  Both cases also noted that although
the precautionary principle in EC Treaty Art. 174 (formerly 130R) is expressly applied to envi-
ronmental policy, the ECJ has held that it applies to health regulatory policy as well (citing the
BSE case, CEC v. French Republic, 2001 E.C.R. I-09989).
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situation in which there is scientific uncertainty, a risk assessment
cannot be required to provide the Community institutions with con-
clusive scientific evidence of the reality of the risk and the seriousness
of the potential adverse effects were that risk to become a reality. . . .
[But] a preventive measure cannot properly be based on a purely
hypothetical approach to the risk, founded on mere conjecture
which has not been scientifically verified . . . Rather, it follows from
the Community Courts’ interpretation of the precautionary principle
that a preventive measure may be taken only if the risk, although the
reality and extent thereof have not been ‘fully demonstrated by con-
clusive scientific evidence,’ appears nevertheless to be adequately
backed up by the scientific data available at the time when the meas-
ure was taken.47
These statements are confusing.  To be sure, precaution must in-
volve action under uncertainty.  But since all decisions involve “situa-
tions in which there is scientific uncertainty,” the court seems to be
saying that a risk assessment is never required.  The court also seems
to misunderstand what a risk assessment would do, presuming that it
would provide “conclusive scientific evidence,” which of course is
never available.  Then the court holds that without such “conclusive
scientific evidence,” the finding of risk must be “adequately backed
up” by the “available” scientific data.  This new standard, if it can be
called that, is highly ambiguous and may generate additional litigation
over the colloquial terms “adequately,” “backed up” and “available,”
and perhaps the question of whether preliminary indications of risk
qualify as “scientific data.”
Later the court tied the power to adopt precautionary measures
to the regulatory body’s determination of the level of acceptable risk
and the tradeoff between gathering additional information to improve
the policy and delay.  It observed:
[U]nless the precautionary principle is to be rendered nugatory, the
fact that it is impossible to carry out a full scientific risk assessment
does not prevent the competent public authority from taking pre-
ventive measures, at very short notice if necessary, when such
measures appear essential given the level of risk to human health
which the authority has deemed unacceptable for society.
. . . In such a situation, the competent public authority must there-
fore weigh up its obligations and decide either to wait until the re-
sults of more detailed scientific research become available or to act
on the basis of the scientific information available.  Where meas-
ures for the protection of human health are concerned, the out-
come of that balancing exercise will depend, account being taken of
the particular circumstances of each individual case, on the level of
47.  Pfizer, ¶¶. 139, 142–44 (emphases added).
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risk which the authority deems unacceptable for society.48
The court seems likely to defer to the regulatory body's choice of
the level of acceptable risk and to its evaluation of this tradeoff be-
tween information and delay.49  The court also held that the recom-
mendations of SCAN are purely advisory and may be rejected by the
Commission and the Council.50  Near the end of its opinion, the court
mentioned that such precautionary regulations adopted before “full”
scientific evidence is available are to be “provisional . . . pending the
availability of additional scientific evidence.”51  But it remains unclear
whose burden it will be to gather such additional information and
when the regulatory body could be required to revise the regulation
in light of the new science.
The court in Alpharma added that a ban could be upheld without
a risk assessment even when the Council and Commission had not
even asked the SCAN for an opinion.52  The court reiterated that
when Community institutions act under the precautionary principle,
judicial review is to be very deferential.53
These decisions appear unlikely to be appealed to the ECJ,
       48.  Id. ¶¶. 160-61.
49.  See id., ¶¶. 169–70 (“It follows that in this case, in which the Community institutions
were required to undertake a scientific risk assessment and to evaluate highly complex scientific
and technical facts, judicial review of the way in which they did so must be limited.  The Com-
munity judicature is not entitled to substitute its assessment of the facts for that of the Commu-
nity institutions, on which the Treaty confers sole responsibility for that duty.  Instead, it must
confine itself to ascertaining whether the exercise by the institutions of their discretion in that
regard is vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers or whether the institutions clearly
exceeded the bounds of their discretion. . . . .  In particular, under the precautionary principle
the Community institutions are entitled, in the interests of human health to adopt, on the basis
of as yet incomplete scientific knowledge, protective measures which may seriously harm legally
protected positions, and they enjoy a broad discretion in that regard.”).  Accord, id., ¶ 323.
50.  Pfizer, ¶¶ 196, 200-201, 204.  The court said that the regulatory bodies may reject the
advice of SCAN so long as they give reasons for doing so, which may include that the action is
“in the interest of human health protection,” id. ¶ 205.  This appears to empower the Commis-
sion and the Council to regulate wherever they assert the requisite interest, regardless of the
evidence of risk.
51.  Pfizer, ¶ 387.
52.  See Alpharma, ¶¶ 152-76, 206 (consulting SCAN is discretionary); ¶ 213 (regulating
without consulting SCAN is only permissible in “exceptional circumstances and where there are
adequate guarantees of scientific objectivity”); ¶ 240 (in the absence of a SCAN opinion, the
Commission and Council may themselves assess the risks “on the basis of information contained
in the SCAN opinions relating to the other antibiotics whose authorisation was withdrawn by
the contested regulation and in the reports of the various international, Community and na-
tional bodies.”); ¶¶ 314-318 (permissible to regulate without consulting SCAN where action is
based on previous SCAN reviews of evidence regarding other antibiotics and on evidence from
international bodies).
53.  See Alpharma, ¶¶ 181, 349.
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whose decision in the BSE case suggests it would reverse.  But if they
were appealed and upheld by the ECJ, the antibiotics cases would
signal that European law will require less in the way of quantitative
risk assessment than U.S. law generally has since Benzene.  The anti-
biotics cases are reminiscent of Ethyl Corp. v. EPA54 and Public Citi-
zen Health Research Group v. Tyson.55  Short of reversing, the ECJ
could limit the applicability of the antibiotics cases.  The degree of
evidence required before regulating could depend, in European as in
American law, on the specific wording of the statute or directive that
provides the legal basis for the regulation.  Thus, the ECJ could limit
the antibiotics cases to the broad “danger” language of Directive
70/524, requiring more risk assessment information under other direc-
tives.  And the ECJ could limit the antibiotics cases to regulations
adopted before the Commission's February 2000 Communication set-
ting forth criteria for invocation of the precautionary principle, in-
cluding the requirement of a risk assessment.  Further, the ECJ could
give more emphasis to the ostensibly “provisional” character of pre-
cautionary measures, holding that regulations may be adopted with-
out a “full” risk assessment, but that such regulations must be revis-
ited and revised in light of new information within a reasonably
prompt period of time.  Whether that new information must be gen-
erated by the regulatory body or the regulated entity could depend on
who is the least-cost provider of the information.
C. Risk Management: Standard-Setting
When actual regulatory policy decisions are made, the trend is
toward convergence.  Both the United States and the European
Commission have now adopted risk assessment and benefit-cost
analysis as basic criteria for new regulations,56 and European law ap-
plies the principle of proportionality, which implies balancing benefits
and costs.57  To be sure, these criteria are not universally applied: for
54.  541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (authorizing precautionary regulation and limiting judicial
review of agency decisions based on uncertain future risks).
55. 796 F.2d 1479 (1986) (upholding regulation of ethylene oxide despite flaws in risk as-
sessment).
56.  Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Review, 58 Federal Register 51735 (September 30,
1993); Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the Precautionary Prin-
ciple, supra note 21.
57.  See NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1996); Pfizer, ¶¶ 410-411 (“The Court considers that a cost/benefit
analysis is a particular expression of the principle of proportionality in cases involving risk man-
agement.   . . . the principle of proportionality, which is one of the general principles of Commu-
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example, some areas of U.S. environmental law are statutorily ex-
empt from considerations of cost; and the European Commission has
invested far less in the institutional capacity needed to review regula-
tions on cost-benefit criteria than has the U.S. executive branch.  But
the trend is toward convergence.  The Bush administration has re-
tained and applied the Clinton administration’s Executive Order
12866 on benefit-cost analysis of new regulations, suggesting continu-
ity rather than an abrupt change in policy.  European member states
have consistently moderated the stringency of the precautionary prin-
ciple when incorporating it into national law, such as by qualifying it
with economic considerations that approach benefit-cost analysis.58
And the European Commission has issued a new Action Plan on Im-
proving Regulation which calls for greater application of the propor-
tionality principle and of consolidated impact assessments of new
regulations and legislation (including impact assessments of amend-
ments made by the European Parliament and Council to the Commis-
sion's legislative proposals).59  Coupled with this Action Plan for Im-
proving Regulation is a new guidance on Impact Assessment of all
major regulatory actions (including regulation, legislation, and inter-
national treaty negotiations), which requires identification of goals,
policy alternatives, positive and negative impacts (including tradeoffs;
economic, social, and environmental consequences; and impacts on
risks), attention to proportionality, and justification for the policy
chosen, with the depth of analysis to be proportionate to the signifi-
cance of the impacts.60  Although they are likely to be less quantita-
nity law, requires that measures adopted by Community institutions should not exceed the limits
of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the
legislation in question, and where there is a choice between several appropriate measures, re-
course must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be dispropor-
tionate to the aims pursued . . .”).  But cf. id.  ¶ 456 (“The Court observes that the importance of
the objective pursued by the contested regulation, i.e. the protection of human health, may jus-
tify adverse consequences, and even substantial adverse consequences, for certain traders . . .
The protection of public health, which the contested regulation is intended to guarantee, must
take precedence over economic considerations.”).
58. See Peter Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, supra note 24;
Wiener, Multirisk World, supra note 11.
59. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission:
Action Plan “Simplifying and Improving the Regulatory Environment,” June 5, 2002,
COM(2002)278 Final, available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/en/com/cnc/2002/com2002_0278en
01.pdf .
60. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission
on Impact Assessment, June 5, 2002, COM(2002)276 Final, available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/governance/suivi_lb_en.htm.  This Impact Assessment guidance, and the Action Plan on
Improving Regulation, supra note 59, are both part of a larger set of initiatives on European
Governance, described at http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/suivi_lb_en.htm.  It remains to
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tively exacting than is benefit-cost regulatory review in the U.S., the
new European approaches to Improving Regulation and Impact As-
sessment embody the core principles of benefit-cost regulatory review
and in some ways go farther than the U.S. approach (such as by cov-
ering legislation and international treaty negotiations) and in some
ways improve on the U.S. approach (such as by aligning the depth of
analysis with its value for affecting policy, rather than the U.S. ap-
proach of setting levels of analysis for regulations having arbitrary
threshold monetary costs of $100 million or $1 billion).  These devel-
opments portend even greater similarity in the use of  benefit-cost
analysis in the U.S. and European regulatory systems.  Both systems
also now involve substantial public participation in standard-setting.61
David Vogel, who has described the transatlantic posture as a rever-
sal of divergent approaches,62 has more recently written of conver-
gence in U.S. and European regulatory approaches.63  Similarly, Rob-
ert A. Kagan argues that broadly speaking, the substantive
environmental standards in the U.S. and Europe are convergent.64
Thus the rhetoric of accelerating  precaution in Europe and re-
trenchment in the United States does not capture the broad underly-
ing reality of convergence in the actual basis for standard-setting.
Sometimes the cost-benefit shoe is even on the other foot.  For exam-
ple, one recent study finds that the U.S. legal regime for air pollution
control is more strict and precautionary than the German regime, in
part because U.S. law requires standards to be set without considering
cost, whereas the German approach applies consideration of benefits
and costs under the principle of proportionality.65  Another study
finds that European regulation is less susceptible to the problems of
tunnel vision (excessive regulation of minor risks) and random
agenda selection that have plagued U.S. regulation.66  Moreover, it is
be seen how these requirements for regulatory analysis will be implemented and overseen.  The
European Commission does not yet have an institutional counterpart to the U.S. apparatus of
regulatory review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
 61. David Vogel, Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States, in YEARBOOK OF
EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, VOL. III (2002), also available at http://faculty.haas.
berkeley.edu/vogel/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (hereinafter Vogel, Risk Regulation).
 62.  Vogel, Ships Passing, supra note 33.
 63.  Vogel, Risk Regulation, supra note 61.
 64. REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS 2-3, 376-77 (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds. 2000).
 65. John P. Dwyer, Richard W. Brooks & Alan C. Marco, The Air Pollution Permit Process
for US and German Automobile Assembly Plants, in Kagan & Axelrad, supra, note 64 at 173,
206-08.
66. Stephen Breyer & Vreele Heyvaert, Institutions for Regulating Risk, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED
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not the case that cost-benefit analysis necessitates weaker regulation;
several examples of greater U.S. precaution, including both the
phaseout of chloroflourocarbins and of lead in gasoline in the 1980s,
were substantially motivated by cost-benefit analyses.  Recently the
United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has initiated
a series of “prompt letters”67 that use cost-benefit analysis to identify
and recommend promising new regulations that the agencies ought to
consider adopting but have not yet—using economics to spur smart
regulation, not just to block bad regulation.  Meanwhile, more pre-
cautionary regulation is not always a triumph over industry influence,
nor is economic analysis always a capitulation to industry; sometimes
industry seeks greater regulation for parochial gain, such as to impose
costs on its trade rivals.68
And, were the contention true that the use of cost-benefit analy-
sis led to moderating some regulations or strengthening others,
whether in the United States or in Europe, that would not necessarily
be unwise—indeed it might be quite sensible.  That is why the Euro-
pean Commission’s “Communication” itself requires cost-benefit
analysis as a predicate to precaution.  More precautionary policies are
not always superior to policies chosen by cost-benefit balancing.  Pre-
caution may avoid the harms of inaction on false negatives (risks
thought to be minor that turn out to be serious) but incur the harms
of overreaction to false positives (risks thought to be serious that turn
out to be minor).69  Both types of errors are harmful to society.  The
harms of ignoring false negatives include the health and environ-
mental damages from the unrestricted risk.  The harms of regulating
false positives include high costs to consumers and workers, unem-
ployment, lost innovations of helpful new products, restrictions on
STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 308-09 (Richard L.
Revesz, Philippe Sands & Richard B. Stewart eds.  2000).
 67. See the OMB/OIRA website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/prompt_letter.
html (last visited June 10, 2003).
 68. See Ann P. Bartel and Lacy G. Thomas, Predation through Regulation: the Wage and
Productivity Impacts of OSHA and EPA, 30 J.L. & ECON. 239–64 (1987); Jonathan B. Wiener,
On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation, 87 GEORGETOWN L.J. 749-794
(1999).
 69. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty,
20 RES. IN LAW & ECON. 71–152 (2002) (translating the precautionary principle into terms of
decision analysis); John D. Graham, Decision-Analytic Refinements of the Precautionary Princi-
ple, 4 J. RISK RESEARCH 127 (2001); Ralph L. Keeney & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Appraising the
Precautionary Principle—A Decision Analysis Perspective, 4 J. RISK RESEARCH 191 (2001); Mi-
chael Dekay et al., Risk-Based Decision Analysis in Support of Precautionary Policies, 5 J. RISK
RESEARCH 391 (2002).
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personal choices, and public cynicism about exaggerated risks (“cry-
ing wolf”).  An extreme policy of zero risk would bring valuable ac-
tivities to a halt; applied broadly it would be impossible.  The goal is
not zero false negatives but the best balance of the two types of errors
that we can achieve.
Even ignoring costs, more precautionary policies are not always
desirable.  In addition to the costs and other inhibitions to innovation
that they may engender, more precautionary policies can also in-
crease rather than decrease risk.  Precaution against a target risk can
induce increases in other countervailing risks.70  For example, airbags
in cars may save adults but kill children.  Banning asbestos may re-
duce cancers but increase highway fatalities due to less effective
brake linings.  Reducing ozone in smog may protect our lungs but put
our skin at risk from increased ultraviolet radiation.  The U.S. FDA’s
precautionary measures to safeguard the blood supply against mad
cow disease may reduce the availability of blood in hospital emer-
gency rooms.  Forestalling climate change by shifting to fuel-efficient
diesel engines may increase local particulate matter air pollution.
Banning one pesticide (e.g., to protect food consumers from residues)
may invite the use of a substitute pesticide (e.g., one that leaves less
residue but that is more toxic to uninformed migrant workers).  Ban-
ning all use of DDT (as opposed to banning just its use in agriculture)
may increase the spread of malaria, killing millions.  Banning chlori-
nation of drinking water may foster deadly outbreaks of cholera and
other microbial pathogens.  The war on drugs may increase inner city
violence.  Police chases of fleeing suspects may kill bystanders.  Sup-
pressing forest fires may worsen these fires when they occur.  In short,
such “risk-risk tradeoffs” are ubiquitous.  And U.S. or European pre-
cautionary policies may act as trade barriers to exports from poorer
countries, thereby significantly burdening the have-nots to satisfy the
demands of wealthy countries for ever greater precaution against mi-
nute risks.  For example, bans on genetically modified foods may per-
petuate hunger and malnutrition in poor countries.  This very di-
lemma faces Zambia and other famine-stricken African nations,
which reject U.S. offers of donated corn, apparently motivated in part
 70. JOHN D. GRAHAM & JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, RISK VS. RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the
Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK: ENVIRONMENT HEALTH & SAFETY 39 (1998).
Of course, regulations may also yield unintended ancillary benefits, which should also be
counted in a full portfolio analysis.  See Graham & Wiener, supra, at 2, 232, 254; Samuel J.
Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards Parity in Envi-
ronmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763 (2002).
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by the fear that U. S. corn might cross-pollinate Zambian corn, ren-
dering future Zambian corn in violation of European restrictions on
imports of genetically modified crops.  Therefore the ideal policy
stance—even from a purely health and environmental perspective—is
not maximum precaution but an optimal precaution that takes into
account the tradeoffs among multiple risks.71
D. Choice of Risks
Disaggregating the overall convergence in regulatory criteria,
one can see differences in the degree of precaution regarding par-
ticular risks, but no simple divergence in which Europe or the United
States is more precautionary than the other across the board.  The
picture is more complex; relative precaution appears to depend on
the risk and the consequences of specific policies than it does on
broad national or temporal postures.
1.  Overview.  Europe appears to be more precautionary than the
United States about such risks as:
• genetically modified (GM) foods 72
• hormones in beef73
• toxic chemicals74
• phthalates in toys75
 71.  See Wiener, Multirisk World, supra note 11.
 72.  See Cadot & Vogel, supra note 33; Lynch & Vogel, supra note 33; Thomas Bernauer &
Erika Meins, Technological Revolution Meets Policy and the Market: Explaining Cross-National
Differences in Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation, EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
RESEARCH (forthcoming 2003).
 73.  See Wiener & Rogers, supra note 10, at 323-27; Charnovitz, supra note 31.
 74.  On June 11, 2003, the European Commission launched a new “European Strategy on
Environment and Health,” focused on protecting children and other vulnerable groups against
the health risks of chemicals, especially simultaneous  exposures to multiple chemicals, through
a comprehensive approach that avoids cross-media shifts of pollutants .  See Communication
from the Commission, A European Environment and Health Strategy, COM(2003)338 final,
June 11, 2003, as well as additional materials at http://europa.eu.int/comm/press_room/
presspacks/health/pp_health_en.htm (last visited June 16, 2003).  The Commission is now also
preparing new legislation to implement its February 2001 “White Paper on the Strategy for a
Future Chemicals Policy,” with public comments on the draft legislation invited until July 10,
2003.  See Commission of the European Communities, Directorates General for Enterprise and
Environment, Internet Consultation on Draft Chemicals Legislation, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/chemicals/white paper.htm (last visited June 10, 2003).
The new chemicals policy would require testing of existing chemicals in addition to new chemi-
cals.  And Sweden has adopted the goal of a “toxins-free society” by 2020.  See Ragnar E. Lof-
stedt, Swedish Chemical Regulation: An Overview and Analysis, 23 RISK ANALYSIS 411 (2003).
75. The European Commission banned phthalates in young children's teething toys in
1999, citing the precautionary principle, see Karen Bowerman, Europe to Ban PVC Toys, BBC
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• climate change (including cuts in greenhouse gas emissions un-
der the Kyoto Protocol, and the use of diesel fuel to reduce
automobile CO2 emissions)
76
• marine pollution77
• guns (gun ownership is far more widespread in America than in
Europe)78
• teenage consumption of marijuana and other illegal drugs79 and
• antitrust/competition policy.80
By contrast, the United States appears to be more precautionary than
Europe about such risks as:
• new drug approval (e.g., thalidomide, which was licensed in
Europe but not in the United States, and more generally, the
News, November 10, 1999, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/514242.stm (visited
June 10, 2003).  The U.S. CPSC has so far found the risk to be very low and has not banned
these substances, and on February 22, 2003, the CPSC denied a petition to ban PVC in chil-
dren’s toys.  (Phthalates, such as DEHP and DINP, are plasticizers that make hard plastics
flexible; they have been used in various products including vinyl, medical equipment, and some
baby toys.)  See REPORT TO THE U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION BY THE
CHRONIC HAZARD ADVISORY PANEL ON DIISONONYL PHTHALATE (DINP), June 2001, avail-
able at (visited June 10, 2003); U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, The Risk of Chronic
Toxicity Associated with Exposure to Diisononyl Phthalate (DINP) in Children’s Products,
Dec. 1998, available at http:// www.cpsc.gov/phth/dinp.html (visited June 10, 2003).  Studies con-
tinue on the effect of phthalates on young children.  See Keith Mulvihill, Pediatricians Call for
More Action on Phthalates, REUTERS HEALTH, June 4, 2003, available at http://www
.ourstolenfuture.org/Commentary/News/2003/2003-0604-RH-pedphthalates.htm (visited June
10, 2003), citing Katherine M. Shea et al., 111 PEDIATRICS 1467-1472 (June 2003).  And the
European Commission is now studying the risks of the substitutes for phthalates in childrens
toys.  See THE AVAILABILITY OF SUBSTITUTES FOR SOFT PVC CONTAINING PHTHALATES IN
CERTAIN TOYS AND CHILDCARE ARTICLES, Final Report Prepared for the European Commis-
sion Directorate-General Enterprise, July 2000, available at http://europa.eu.int/
comm/enterprise/chemicals/legislation/markrestr/studies/phthalates.pdf (last visited June 10,
2003).
 76.  See Jonathan B. Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regula-
tion, 87 GEO. L.J. 749 (1999); RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER,
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY (2003); Diesel Technology Forum, Demand for Diesels:
The European Experience (July 2001), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/vogel/ (last
visited Mar. 4, 2003).
 77.  See DE SAADELEER, supra note 19, at 94-96.
 78.  See United Nations, International Study on Firearm Regulation 52-53 (1998); and see
discussion below in Part III.D.2.
 79. See Bjorn Hibell, et al., The 1999 ESPAD Report: Alcohol and Other Drug Use Among
Students in 30 European Countries, Council of Europe, Stockholm (2001) (summary available at
http://monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/espad_pr.pdf  (visited June 10, 2003)).
 80.  See Richter, supra note 30; Anita Raghavan & Brandon Mitchener, EU's Antitrust
Czar Isn't Afraid to Say No; Just Ask Time Warner, WALL ST.  J., Oct. 2, 2000, at A1 (reporting
that European competition regulators have become more proactive than U.S. regulators, such
that mergers that have U.S. approval get blocked in Europe; “‘You wonder sometimes if you’re
guilty until proven innocent,’ says one executive.”).
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more cautious pace of new drug approval in the United
States.)81
• lead in gasoline (petrol) (phased out approximately a decade
earlier in the United States than in Europe)82
• the stratospheric ozone layer (the United States stopped de-
veloping the supersonic transport (SST) in the 1970s on this
concern, while Europe pressed ahead with the Concorde; and
the United States banned CFCs in aerosol spray cans in 1978,
almost a decade before Europe began to phase out CFCs)83
• particulate matter (the United States sets more stringent stan-
dards for automobile particulate emissions, thereby effec-
tively restricting diesel engines to less than 1% of the market,
compared to over 20% of the market in Europe where diesel
is promoted to reduce CO2 emissions)
84
• nuclear energy (the United States has regulated civilian nuclear
power plants more tightly and has used nuclear energy less
than have France and other European countries; and the
United States stopped adding to its nuclear power plants af-
ter 1980 while Europe and Japan continued to add some re-
 81.  See PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW, 580-83
(2d ed. 1991); GAO, FDA DRUG APPROVAL: A LENGTHY PROCESS THAT DELAYS THE
AVAILABILITY OF IMPORTANT NEW DRUGS (1980).
 82.  The United States phased out lead in gasoline from 1.1 grams per gallon in 1981 to 0.1
grams per gallon by 1987.  See 50 Fed.  Reg. 9386 (Mar, 7, 1985).  By that date the United
Kingdom still allowed 0.13 grams of lead per litre, see United Kingdom Dep’t of the
Environment, Unleaded Petrol: The United Kingdom Position (Feb. 1991), which was about
five times greater than the U.S. 0.1 grams per gallon.  Many other European countries allowed
even more.  Lead in gasoline was completely phased in the United States out by 1989. WINSTON
HARRINGTON & VIRGINIA MCCONNELL, MOTOR VEHICLES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 43
(2003), available at http://www.rff.org/reports/PDF_files/CarsEnvironment.pdf (last visited June
10, 2003).  At the Aarhus Conference on Environment for Europe in 1998, European countries
agreed to phase out lead in petrol completely by 2005.  See Environment for Europe, Lead to Be
Phased out of Petrol in Europe, June 24, 1998, available at http://www.mim.dk/aarhus
conference/press/june/240698a.htm (visited June 10, 2003); United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe, Phase-Out of Leaded Petrol, available at http://www.unece.org/env/
europe/phaseout_of_leaded_petrol.htm (visited June 10, 2003) (linking to official “Pan-
European Strategy To Phase Out Leaded Petrol”).
83.  See KAREN T. LITFIN, OZONE DISCOURSES 64-67 (1994) (reporting that Oregon and
New York banned CFCs in aerosol spray cans in the mid-1970s; the United States adopted a
national ban in 1978 (expressly on the view of the chair of CEQ that “chemicals are not inno-
cent until proven guilty”); but “only Canada, Sweden and Norway . . . followed the US lead in
implementing an aerosol ban. . . . Despite pressure from the USA, the . . . EC refused to adopt
an aerosol ban.”).  The Montreal Protocol phasing out CFCs was adopted in 1987.  Id.
84.  See Diesel Technology Forum, supra note 76; HARRINGTON & MCCONNELL, supra
note 82, at 44.
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actors)85
• teenage consumption of alcohol and tobacco86
• speed limits on major highways87
• mad cow disease (BSE) in beef and especially in blood dona-
tions88
• choking hazards embedded in food89
• “right to know” disclosure requirements (the United States has
a suite of provisions such as FOIA, NEPA, TRI, CAA
112(r), Calif. Prop 65, OSHA Hazard Communication Stan-
dard, while Europe has only recently begun to act in this
area)90
85.  The United States obtains about 18% of its electricity from nuclear power, while
France obtains 79%, Belgium 60%, Sweden 42%, and Germany 29%.  See International Atomic
Energy Agency, The Energy Challenge: The Nuclear Power Potential (1996), available at
http://www. iaea.or.at/worldatom/Press/Booklets/Development/devfive.html (last visited June
10, 2003).  On nuclear energy construction since 1980, see Christopher Flavin & Nicholas Lens-
sen, Nuclear Power Nears Peak, Worldwatch Institute News Brief, March 5, 1999, available at
http://www.worldwatch.org/alerts/990304.html (last visited June 10, 2003) (“In the aftermath of
the 1979 Three Mile Island accident, the U.S. nuclear market was the first to deteriorate.  No
new nuclear plants have been ordered since then, and nuclear generating capacity is now lower
than it was a decade ago.  Not only have U.S. power companies stopped building nuclear power
plants, they have closed six reactors since 1996 that had become too expensive to operate.
Meanwhile, seven of Canada's 21 reactors have been “laid up” due to safety concerns and are
unlikely to operate again. . . .Western Europe stayed with its nuclear expansion plans longer
than the U.S. did, . . . since the 1986 explosion at Chernobyl . . . construction has started on only
three new reactors.  France, long known as the most pro-nuclear country, now has a moratorium
on nuclear plant construction . . ..  In Germany, the discussion is not over whether to build more
nuclear plants, but on how quickly to shut down the existing reactors. . . .  Asia remains the last
stronghold for the nuclear power industry, with 88 reactors operating and 26 under construction,
though even there, a slowdown is evident.  Japan, which obtains 35 percent of its electricity from
the atom, only has two reactors under construction, with work starting on one of them in 1998.”)
86. See Hibell, et al., supra note 79.  Interestingly, the new Framework Convention on To-
bacco Control, sponsored by the World Health Organization and adopted on May 21, 2003, see
http://tobacco.who.int/, was opposed in part and temporarily by both the United States and
Germany – an odd coalition against precaution.
87.  See http://www.ibiblio.org/rdu/sl-inter.html (last visited June 10, 2003) (reporting that
as of 1992, compared to the U.S. speed limit of 55 (or occasionally 65 or 70) mph, the speed lim-
its in Europe included United Kindom: 70 mph; Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain: 75 mph; Austria, France and Italy: 81 mph; and Germany: Unlimited).
88. See Wiener & Rogers, supra note 10.
89. See Bryan Harris, A Comparison of U.S. and E.U. Product Safety Regulations: A Case
Study, 8 RISK: HEALTH SAFETY & ENVIRONMENT 209 (1997).
90. The acronyms refer to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq.; the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (which requires Environmental Impact Statements), 43 U.S.C.
§ 4321 et seq. (1969); the Toxics Release Inventory, www.epa.gov/tri/, created by 42 U.S.C. §
11001 et seq. (1986); the Clean Air Act section 112( R) on risk management plans, 42 U.S.C. §
7412 (r) (1990); California's Proposition 65 requiring carcinogen warnings, Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 25249.5 et seq. (1986); and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Hazard
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• potentially violent persons91 such as violent youths, mental
health patients, and recovering sex offenders and
• terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).92
The length of these lists is not important; as discussed below in
Part IV.A, neither set of examples is yet a representative sample of
the full population of cases and thus neither set fully proves a general
characterization.  Moreover, the point is not a contest to determine
who is “more precautionary than thou.”  This broader set of examples
merely indicates that neither the United States nor the EU can claim
to be the more precautionary actor across the board, whether today
or in the past.  Simple contrasts, such as that Americans are risk-
takers while Europeans are risk-averse,93 or that Americans are indi-
vidualistic and anti-regulation while Europeans are collectivist and
pro-regulation,94 are unsupported by the evidence of actual regulatory
policies.  These stereotypes are also at odds with the “flip-flop” hy-
pothesis of greater U.S. precaution followed by greater European
precaution.
A better synthesis is that both the United States and Europe are
precautionary, but against different risks.  Some of these examples
are consistent with the “flip–flop” hypothesis: the greater U.S. pre-
caution in the 1970s regarding new drug approval, CFCs in aerosol
spray cans, supersonic transport, and the phaseout of lead in gasoline
(petrol); and the greater European precaution more recently regard-
ing GM foods, climate, hormones in beef, toxic chemicals, and
phthalates.  But other examples are inconsistent with the “flip–flop”
hypothesis: the greater European precaution in the 1970s regarding
marine pollution and guns; and the greater U.S. precaution in recent
Communication Standard, see www.osha.gov/SLTC/hazardcommunications and 29 C.F.R.
1910.1200.  See Peter H. Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, 6 HUMAN
AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 445, 452 (2000), supra note 24; Peter H. Sand, The Reality
of Precaution: Information Disclosure by Government and Industry, paper presented at the Sec-
ond Transatlantic Dialogue on “The Reality of Precaution: Comparing Approaches to Risk and
Regulation,” Airlie House, 15 June 2002, available at http://www.env.duke.edu/ solu-
tions/documents/sand_airlie_june_2002.doc (last visited Feb. 24, 2003) (hereinafter Sand, In-
formation Disclosure); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (1995).
 91. See discussion infra in Part III.D.2.
 92. Id.
93. See Wilde, supra note 1; Lamy, quoted in Charnovitz, supra note 31 at 295 n.181.
94. See, e.g., Levy & Newell, supra note 30 (reporting the “conventional wisdom” that
“Europeans demonstrate their considerable concern about environmental issues” while “people
in the United States are more individualistic, more concerned about their lifestyles than about
the environment, and more ideologically averse to regulation.”) (citation omitted).
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years regarding BSE in blood, particulate matter and diesel, smoking,
right to know measures, restraints on potentially violent persons, and
terrorism.  This complexity is compounded by the variation within
each system: both are federations of subsidiary jurisdictions, with
considerable variety in regulatory approaches across member states.95
2.  Specific Cases.  Analyzing specific examples of recent precau-
tionary policies in more detail helps demonstrate that the pattern is
not of increasing European precaution and declining U.S. precaution,
but rather simultaneous precaution against different risks.  The next
four subsections focus on such cases: diesel emissions, mad cow dis-
ease, violence, and terrorism.
a.  Diesel Emissions.  The example of diesel engines and emis-
sions nicely illustrates simultaneous U.S. and European precaution
regarding different risks.  The United States tightly regulates diesel
engines to reduce human exposure to fine particulate matter,96 while
Europe promotes diesel engines to reduce carbon dioxide emissions
and global warming.  Both policies are precautionary, but against dif-
ferent—and directly countervailing—risks.
b.  Mad Cow Disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE)).  Another example of simultaneous but differing precaution
involves BSE.97  The United States banned the import of British beef
in 1989, several years before the EU adopted such a ban.98  The EU
has since lifted its ban—and sued France in the ECJ to force France
to lift its ban99—while the U.S. ban remains in place.  Meanwhile,
however, Europe has adopted somewhat more stringent policies than
the United States regarding the kinds of protein matter that can be
fed to cattle and sheep.  On the other hand, in 1999 the FDA adopted
a “Precautionary Measure” that prohibits blood banks from collecting
blood from donors who have spent six months or more in the United
Kingdom.100  In  2001, the FDA went further, rejecting any donor who
95. See generally CHRISTOPHER HOOD, HENRY ROTHSTEIN, & ROBERT BALDWIN, THE
GOVERNMENT OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES (2001) (demonstrat-
ing considerable variation across risk regulation regimes within Great Britain).
96. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Administration Approves Stiff Penalties for Diesel Engine
Emissions, Angering Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at A11.
97. For further discussion, see generally Wiener & Rogers, supra note 10.
98. See generally Wiener & Rogers, supra note 10.
99. CEC v. French Republic, discussed supra note 43.
100. See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration,
Guidance for Industry: Revised Precautionary Measures to Reduce the Possible Risk of Trans-
mission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and New Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
(vCJD) by Blood and Blood Products (Aug. 17, 1999)), at http://www.fda.gov/cber/guidlines.
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had spent three months or more in the United Kingdom or five years
or more anywhere in Europe since 1980.101  The FDA acted despite
recognizing that there have been no studies showing human blood
transmission of the human form of BSE, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease (vCJD), only conflicting animal data, and no cases yet of
vCJD in the United States;102 that the “transmissibility of vCJD by
blood or blood products is unknown” and “transmissibility [of vCJD]
cannot confidently be predicted from studies of CJD;”103 and that “No
transmission of CJD or vCJD by human blood components or plasma
derivatives has been documented to date.”104  European officials con-
sidered the risk “theoretical” and “very small” at the most.105  But the
FDA said that “[u]ntil more is known about the possibility of vCJD
transmission by blood components or plasma derivatives, a precau-
tionary policy of withdrawal for all of these products is recommended
for material from donors with vCJD.”106
The boldness of this precautionary move is evident from the
countervailing risk it creates: a shortage of blood for use in hospital
operating rooms.  Blood supply in the United States is already very
short.  The Red Cross testified to the FDA that the 1999 policy would
likely reduce the pool of eligible donors by about two percent, con-
centrated among the group of frequent repeat donors who account
for a large share of donated blood,107 and the 2001 policy would re-
duce the blood supply by five to eight percent.108  Blood shortages
would be severe in New York City: in addition to losing eight percent
of its U.S. donors, New York would lose the 25 percent of its blood
supply that is imported from European donors who would be banned
htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2003) (hereinafter Guidance for Industry).
101. See Raymond Hernandez, Citing Disease, F.D.A. Panel Backs Blood Donor Curbs,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at B3.  The revised policy is U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Food and Drug Administration, Guidance for Industry: Revised Preventive Measures to
Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and Variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) by Blood and Blood Products (January 2002), at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/cjdvcjd.htm (last visited June 10, 2003).
102. See Guidance for Industry,  supra note 100, at part II.
 103. Id. at part II.B.
104. Id. at part V.B.
 105. John Tagliabue, US Plan to Halt Blood Imports Worries Europe, N.Y. TIMES July 17,
2001, at A1.
106. Guidance for Industry, supra note 100 at end of part II.B.
107. United States Food and Drug Administration, Advisory Committee on Transmissible
Spongiform Encephalopathies, Hearings of 2 June 1999, SAG Corp. Transcript, at 46 (State-
ment of Dr. Williams), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/cber99.htm (last visited
June 10, 2003).
108. Tagliabue, supra note 105.
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under the 2001 policy.109  These reductions in blood supply pose a high
and fairly certain risk of death to those who need emergency blood
during operations—in New York, a “disastrous . . . public health cri-
sis.”110  Europe has not adopted such stringent restrictions on blood
donations, though it has undertaken leukodepletion on the theory
that the disease agent (the prion) is more likely to be carried by white
blood cells; and the United Kingdom has recently begun importing
blood for young children.111  In short, the United States has been more
precautionary regarding a risk of much greater impact and public
concern in Europe.
c.  Violence.  Violence is an issue of public health and public pol-
icy.112  The conventional wisdom seems to be that Europe is more pre-
cautionary while the United States is a more risk-taking and violent
society.113  Yet closer inspection reveals a more complex pattern.  On
some issues, Europe is more precautionary; on others, the United
States is more precautionary.  Indeed it is sometimes the very precau-
tionary approach taken in the United States that can seem barbaric to
Europeans.  This examination illustrates further the weakness of sim-
ple cross-national comparisons.  It also sheds new light on some of the
drawbacks to aggressive precautionary regulation.
An oft-cited example of greater precaution in Europe is gun con-
trol.  There appear to be far more guns available per household in the
United States than in Europe; according to the UN, an estimated 41
 109. Id.
 110. Id.
111. See Wiener & Rogers, supra note 10. Motivated in part by its scandal over HIV-tainted
blood, France has banned blood donations by people who have spent one year or more in Brit-
ain.  See Kenneth Lee, France Acts on Threat of BSE Transmission by Blood, THE SCIENTIST,
Jan. 23, 2001, available at www.biomedcentral.com/news/20010123/05/ (last visited July 3, 2003).
The U.S. policy is tighter: three months in Britain or five years anywhere in Europe.
112. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH
(2002), available at http://www5.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/main.cfm?p=0000000117
(treating violence as a public health issue); PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOLENCE:
THE REAL COSTS (2000) (similar).  In 1999 (the latest year for which final statistics have been
reported), violence (including both homicide and suicide) accounted for approximately 45,000
deaths or about 2 percent of annual fatalities in the United States, with suicide claiming 29,199
lives and homicide claiming 16,889.  See Donna L. Hoyert et al., Deaths: Final Data for 1999,
National Vital Statistics Report, Vol. 49, No. 8 (September 21, 2001) at 6 & Table C, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr49/nvsr49_08.pdf (last visited June 10, 2003).  Meanwhile,
“[i]n 1999 a total of 28,874 persons died from firearm injuries in the United States . . . . Firearm
suicide and homicide, the two major component causes, accounted for 57.5 and 37.5 percent,
respectively, of all firearm injury deaths in 1999 [with firearms accidents accounting for 2.9 per-
cent].”  Id. at 10.
113. See Daley, supra note 37.
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percent of U.S. households have at least one firearm, compared to
only 10 percent in Germany, 4 percent in the United Kingdom, 8 per-
cent in Denmark, and 20 percent in Sweden.114  Most European coun-
tries have national gun licensing requirements, whereas the United
States does not.115  The United States has only recently adopted the
Brady Act requiring background checks, part of which was declared
unconstitutional,116 and the rest of which has been criticized as incom-
plete (for example, for failing to cover gun shows).
The rate of gun homicides per 100,000 population is estimated at
roughly 6 to 7 in the United States, compared to only 0.4 in France,
0.2 in Germany, 0.1 in the United Kingdom, 0.2 in Denmark, and 0.2
to 0.3 in Sweden.117  Whereas gun homicides account for about two-
thirds to three-quarters of homicides in the United States, they ac-
count for only about one-third of homicides in France and about one-
fifth to one-tenth of homicides in Germany, the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Sweden.118  When gun-related suicides and accidents
are added to homicides, the rate of gun deaths per 100,000 population
is estimated at 14 in the United States, compared to only 1.5 in Ger-
many, 0.5 in the United Kingdom, and 2.3 in Sweden.119
To be sure, these gun death statistics do not necessarily demon-
strate that more stringent gun control laws would reduce gun violence
in the United States (nor that it is gun laws that have prevented
higher gun death rates in Europe).120  There is a spirited debate
whether laws restricting gun ownership are effective in reducing gun
deaths or actually increase gun deaths.121  All that these comparisons
114. See United Nations, International Study on Firearm Regulation 52-53 (1998).
115. Id. at 52-53.  Yet states of the United States may have their own licensing systems; the
appropriate comparison to a United States national license requirement would be a Europe-
wide EU license requirement, which does not yet exist.
116. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that United States federal
government cannot constitutionally “commandeer” local law enforcement officers to enforce
federal background check requirements).
117. United Nations, International Study on Firearm Regulation 179-181 (1998).
 118. Id.
 119. Id. at 108-109.
120. Cf. Setsuo Miyazawa, The Enigma of Japan as a Testing Ground for Cross-Cultural
Criminological Studies, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 195 (David Nelkin ed. 1997) (de-
scribing complexities in comparing criminal laws across cultures, though rejecting many culture-
specific theories of low crime in Japan).
121. Compare COOK & LUDWIG, supra note 112 (finding that gun controls reduce violence),
and EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE (Jens Ludwig & Philip I.
Cook eds. 2003) (similar, including critiques of work by John Lott), with JOHN R. LOTT, JR.,
MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-CONTROL LAWS (1998) (find-
ing that gun controls increase violence and concealed weapons permits reduce violence) and
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suggest is that Europe has adopted a more precautionary, ex ante
regulatory approach which restricts the spread of guns.  It is a precau-
tionary strategy precisely because it has been adopted under debate
and uncertainty about the risks of wider gun ownership and the ef-
fects of the ostensibly preventive laws restricting gun ownership.
By contrast, in the 1990’s the United States undertook a more
precautionary approach to youth violence.  Punishments for juvenile
offenders were made more severe in the United States than in
Europe.  Among other examples, the United States allows longer
prison terms for juveniles than do most European countries,122 and the
United States allows convicts to be executed for murders committed
before adulthood whereas Europe does not.123
The United States generally allows juvenile offenders to be tried
as adults at earlier ages than do European legal systems.124  Over the
last decade, U.S. states have been revising their laws to enable or re-
quire prosecution of youths as adults at earlier ages, to increase sen-
tences for juvenile offenders, and to reduce the confidentiality of ju-
venile offenders’ records.125
JOHN R. LOTT, JR., THE BIAS AGAINST GUNS: WHY ALMOST EVERYTHING YOU’VE HEARD
ABOUT GUN CONTROL IS WRONG (2003) (arguing that advocacy of gun control is biased).
122. See generally JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (John A.
Winterdyk ed. 1997) (comparing penalties for juvenile crime across numerous countries).
123. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Sara Rimer & Raymond Boner, Young
and Condemned: Whether to Kill Those who Killed as Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2000, at A1
(reporting plans in the year 2000 to execute five people who committed murder before age 18;
and noting that the European Union views this practice as morally repugnant).  But see Joshua
Micah Marshall, Death in Venice: Europe's Death-Penalty Elitism, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 31,
2000, at 12 (reporting that public attitudes in Europe are just as favorable to capital punishment
as they are in America, and attributing European condemnation of capital punishment to Euro-
pean government elites).
One might object that the death penalty is not “precautionary” because it is imposed ex
post (after the murder).  Advocates of capital punishment might respond that the death penalty
is precautionary because it deters others, and because it incapacitates the murderer and thereby
prevents future repeat behavior.  (The latter a claim that is stronger the younger the executed
felon.)  If it is neither a deterrent nor an incapacitator, and is purely retributive, then the death
penalty may well fall outside the class of precautionary criminal laws; and any argument for im-
posing the death penalty would be significantly weaker as well.  The point here is only that the
death penalty for those who committed juvenile murders is an early and extremely stringent
government intervention intended at least in part to prevent uncertain future risks to public
safety.
124. See Winterdyk ed., supra note 122; Christian Pfeiffer, Juvenile Crime and Violence in
Europe, 23 Crime & Justice 255, 311-322 (Nov. 1998).
 125. See Patricia Torbet & Linda Szymanski, State Legislative Responses to Violent Juvenile
Crime: 1996-97 Update, US DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, Nov. 1998; Margaret Talbot,
What's Become of the Juvenile Delinquent?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 10, 2000, at 41.
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These measures are precautionary because they attempt to inter-
vene more stringently, and especially earlier, to incapacitate and deter
young people from committing future violent acts—which are uncer-
tain future risks.  The future violence of juveniles is highly uncertain,
and despite predictions in the 1980s of a coming wave of youth vio-
lence, the data do not show such an epidemic of youth violence occur-
ring.126
Of course, these precautionary measures do not necessarily help
to reduce juvenile crime.  Prosecuting and imprisoning juveniles as
adults might incapacitate some offenders but might also train some
youths to be hardened recidivist criminals.127  Tough juvenile penalties
are a precautionary strategy precisely because they have been
adopted under uncertainty about the eventual risks of young felons as
they mature.  Like other precautionary strategies, tough juvenile pen-
alties may prove to be protective or may yield countervailing risks
that offset or even reverse the protective effects.
A related example is the treatment of sex offenders after release
from incarceration.  In the United States, the residence of these os-
tensibly dangerous persons can be publicized to neighbors, whereas in
the United Kingdom the confidentiality of the recovering offender is
maintained.128  At the same time, in the United Kingdom there is
more widespread use of video monitoring cameras to record ordinary
daily life in public places—intersections, shopping malls, parks—as a
precautionary strategy to detect and deter crime.  Such a policy had
not been adopted in the United States, and might be held unconstitu-
tional, but may now become increasingly practiced and accepted in
the United States since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Another example of U.S. precaution against future violence is
the treatment of mentally ill persons who may pose a threat to them-
selves or others.  The traditional approach has been reactive, arrest-
ing mentally ill persons only after they have committed a serious of-
fense.  Ex post intervention tolerated the risk of false negatives—
people the police initially declined to arrest but who later turned out
 126. See Franklin E. Zimring, The Youth Violence Epidemic: Myth or Reality?, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV.  727 (1998); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE, 3-16, 31-
65 (2d ed. 2001)
127. See Eric K. Klein, Note, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371 (1998).
128. See Christopher Hood & Robert Baldwin, Why is Risk Regulated in Different Ways?
Beyond the Risk Society Debate, RISK & REGULATION (LSE-CARR on-line magazine),
(viewed on Sept. 25, 2000) at http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts.carr/n14.htm.  Many U.S. states have
enacted versions of “Megan’s Law” requiring precautionary disclosure of former sex offenders’
whereabouts.
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ple the police initially declined to arrest but who later turned out to
cause harm.  In an effort to prevent such violent acts before they oc-
cur, police and mental health workers in some cities, such as Los An-
geles and Birmingham, have begun to work together to undertake
more precautionary interventions.129  The program in Ithaca, New
York is noted for its very early and collaborative interventions by po-
lice and mental health workers; there the goal is to approach appar-
ently mentally ill persons before they have committed violence—“you
solve problems even when they’re not problems,”130 and “you don’t
know whether you prevented something or not.”131  Sometimes these
interventions result in hospitalization or incarceration of the ill per-
son.  Nationwide, a rising number of young mentally ill persons are
incarcerated to prevent future violence.132  Although these proactive
strategies can protect against future violence, that forecast is neces-
sarily uncertain.  There could be false positives—people labeled as
mentally ill, and then treated or incarcerated, who would not have
been violent in the future.  And “such aggressive police involvement
has a risk . . ..  ‘There is a potential invasiveness there for individuals
who would feel coerced into mental health services’. . ..”133  “‘[I]f it’s
done the wrong way it conjures up images of Big Brother at its
worst.’”134
These stringent and early applications of criminal law in the
United States highlight the restrictions on personal freedom that can
be associated with the precautionary principle.  If the basic version of
the PP were generally applied to human beings, scientific uncertainty
about one’s future criminality would not be an excuse to avoid pres-
ent incarceration.  If the burden-shifting version of the PP were ap-
plied to human beings, each of us would have the burden of proving
to the government our future non-violence, or else we would be in-
carcerated until we could do so.  In Philip K. Dick’s marvelous story
 129. See Laurie Goodstein, Trying to Prevent the Next Killer Rampage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
2000, at A1.
130. Id.  (quoting Terry Garahan, Ithaca N.Y. mental health worker).
131. Id.  at A18 (quoting Garahan).
132. See Fox Butterfield, Concern Rising Over Use of Juvenile Prisons to 'Wharehouse' the
Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at A14.
133. Id.  at A18 (quoting Henry J.  Steadman, president of Policy Research Associates).
134. Goodstein, supra note 129, at A18 (quoting Ron Hornberg, director of legal affairs at
the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill).  Similarly, Judge Terry Friedman of Los Angeles
County Juvenile Court says that "In essence, we are criminalizing mental illness . . . because
they are untreated, their illness leads them to act out, sometimes violently, so we lock them
up . . ." quoted in Butterfield, supra note 132, at A14.
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“Minority Report,”135 a future United States uses genetically engi-
neered prescience to foresee and stop crimes before they happen by
arresting and incarcerating would-be murderers.  The story is a rev-
erie about the dangers of gearing up the machinery of the state to im-
plement precaution when there is always a risk of false positives.
Meanwhile, even apart from any concern for the imprisoned in-
dividual defendant, there are also countervailing risks to the public.
The defendant’s incarceration could mollify the citizenry but leave
the true culprit at large, could generate future violent behavior (re-
cidivism), and could displace other more violent persons from state
custody.  And high-speed police chases to catch fleeing felons (a pre-
cautionary measure to prevent future violence by the suspect) kill
hundreds of bystanders every year.136
Perhaps a “truly” precautionary approach to violent crime would
intervene even earlier than do gun control and the juvenile justice
and mental health systems.  Even more precautionary measures might
include community policing, childhood education, aid to the indigent,
jobs, and basic inculcation of moral virtues.  Opportunity, social reci-
procity, and hope might be cited as the most precautionary invest-
ments against future violence.  True, but these apply to the health and
environmental area as well: strong and virtuous social norms, com-
munity bonds, and economic opportunities tend to support sound en-
vironmental conservation.137  If the PP is an argument for investments
in social norms and economic growth, it becomes so general that it
loses its traction as a guide to regulatory policy.  In any event, advo-
cates of the PP use it to advocate legal rules restricting risky activities,
not social values and improved prospects in general.
Of course, proponents of the PP do not usually advocate its ap-
135. See PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY REPORT AND OTHER CLASSIC STORIES (re-
printed Citadel Press 2003).  The story became a movie starring Tom Cruise as "Precrime" chief
detective John Anderton.  In both the story and the movie, Anderton finds himself predicted to
commit a murder, and he knows the prediction to be a false positive.  His dilemma is whether to
resist his fate, revealing a flaw in the prediction and leading to the dismantling of the Precrime
regime, or to commit the murder anyway, sacrificing himself (and his victim) to preserve the
apparent accuracy of the prediction and thus keep Precrime in operation to protect others de-
spite the risk of erroneous forecasts.  The story and the movie resolve this dilemma differently,
underscoring the vexing problem of false positives.
136. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK:
HEALTH SAFETY ENVIRONMENT 39, 39-42 (1998).
137. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990); ROBERT ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1993); Robert T. Deacon, Deforestation and the Rule of Law in a Cross
Section of Countries, 70 LAND ECON. 414-430 (1994) (showing that hope and economic security
reduce deforestation).
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plication to crime suspects or to the regulation of human beings.  Tal-
bot Page drew a sharp opposition between environmental law and
criminal law, advocating the standard presumption of “innocent until
proven guilty” for prosecutions of suspected violent criminals but a
reversed presumption of “guilty until proven innocent” for precaution
against uncertain environmental risks.138  Page argued that both types
of precaution would benefit public health, but that the cost of crimi-
nal precaution would be freedom (valued more than health), while
the cost of environmental precaution would only be money (valued
less than health).  Yet the prospect of countervailing risks,139 ne-
glected by Page, means that the cost of environmental precaution
could also be health; and the prospect of restrictions on freedom (in-
cluding criminal sanctions) to enforce health and environmental pro-
tections means that the cost of environmental precaution could also
be freedom.  Thus even if one accepts Page's hierarchy of values—
freedom trumps health trumps money140—this premise does not
clearly favor environmental precaution.  And the PP is meant to be a
broadly applicable principle of government law and policy to prevent
uncertain threats to health and safety.  At its annual convention in
February 2000, the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS) held a full-day session on the PP titled “The
Precautionary Principle: When is it Appropriate to Presume ‘Guilty
Until Proven Innocent’?”  All precautionary regulations restrict
human beings in some way—that is what regulation means.  To a
significant degree, everyone (liberals and conservatives alike) wants
the state to restrict the ability of one person to be a source of risk to
others, whether by his own hands (violence) or by the technologies he
deploys (e.g., automobiles or chemicals or electric power or beef).  If
the PP must retreat each time an area of important risk regulation
turns out to restrict individual choice, then the PP is not much of a
general principle.  Or, more constructively, examples such as violent
crime help make more plain that precautionary regulation has
disadvantages as well as advantages, which in turn helps us recognize
138. Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7 ECOLOGY L. Q.
207 (1978).
139. See GRAHAM & WIENER, RISK VS. RISK, supra note 70; Wiener, Multirisk World, su-
pra note 11; Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, supra note 136.
140. An argument similar to Page’s is made by Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit
Analysis with the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 114 (2001),
and used to advocate precaution in Mark Geistfeld, Implementing the Precautionary Principle,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11326 (Nov. 2001).  Like Page, Geistfeld analyzes a decision to confront a
single risk and neglects the world of multiple risks in which precautions may themselves increase
countervailing risks to health and safety.
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advantages, which in turn helps us recognize this reality in the health
and environmental arena.
d.  Terrorism.141  In September 2002, President Bush formally an-
nounced a new U.S. doctrine of preemptive self-defense, promising
that the United States will use preemptive military strikes to thwart
threats of terror and mass destruction.  His policy provides that
“America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully
formed. . . .  The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction
and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to de-
fend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of
the enemy's attack.”142  Similarly, in a speech at West Point on June 1,
2002, he said: “if we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have
waited too long.”143  On that view, the Bush administration pressed
ahead with preemptive military intervention in Iraq and aggressive
investigative and monitoring policies at home.
This new doctrine, and the prospect of U.S. strikes against Iraq
before UN weapons inspectors found a “smoking gun,” sparked a re-
newed critique of alleged American unilateralism (following outrage
over U.S. rejection of the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto
Protocol, and other multilateral accords), and a new resentment at
the lone superpower perceived as acting aggressively and prema-
turely, before the evidence is in.  German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer, whose Green party narrowly won reelection to the governing
coalition in part by sharply criticizing U.S. aggressiveness toward
Iraq, worried aloud on September 14, 2002 to the UN General As-
sembly: “to what consequences would military intervention lead?  . . .
Are there new and definite findings and facts?  Does the threat as-
sessment justify taking a very high risk?  . . . we are full of deep skep-
ticism regarding military action. . . .”144  While the U.S. government
wants fast and forceful action to prevent the next terrorist attack, its
detractors in Europe want more evidence and deliberation before
141. On the relevance of terrorism to regulatory policy, see Eric A. Posner, Fear and the
Regulatory Model of Counterterrorism, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 681 (2002).
142. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17, 2002,
Introduction & Part V, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (last visited March 1, 2003).
143. Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military
Academy,  West Point, New York, June 1, 2002, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/06/20020601-3.html (last visited March 1, 2003).
144. Address by Joschka Fischer, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Germany, at the Fifty-seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York,
Sept. 14, 2002, available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/index_html
(visited March 6, 2003).
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acting.  British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell attempted to make that case in early 2003.  Still, France
and Germany opposed intervention.  Many Americans became exas-
perated with European opposition to precautionary U.S. action in
Iraq,145 just as Europeans have resented U.S. opposition to environ-
mental precaution.  Now, after the war in Iraq and the failure (so far)
to find compelling evidence that Iraq was creating or deploying
weapons of mass destruction, critics question whether the United
States and Britain acted prematurely146—in effect, whether the United
States and Britain “cried wolf” and undertook precaution based on a
false positive.
But the terrorism example illustrates that the new U.S. doctrine
of preemptive self-defense is based on the same logic as the precau-
tionary principle.  In advocating precaution, European leaders—es-
pecially Greens—make the same point that President Bush has made
about terrorism: if we wait to confirm that the threat is real, it will be
too late.  The European Environment Agency advised in January:
“forestalling disasters usually requires acting before there is strong
proof of harm.”147  Said the EU's Environment Commissioner, Margot
Wallstrom, on April 25, 2003: “if you smell smoke, you don’t wait un-
til your house is burning down before you tackle the cause.”148  Like-
wise nongovernmental advocates of the precautionary principle say:
“sometimes if we wait for proof it is too late.  . . . If we always wait for
scientific certainty, people may suffer and die, and damage to the
natural world may be irreversible.”149  These are almost verbatim the
same justifications given by President Bush for preemptive interven-
tion to fight terrorism.  The United States, under both Presidents
Bush and Clinton, criticized the precautionary stance as applied to
health and environmental risks and sued in the WTO to block precau-
tionary regulations.  But President Bush would invoke precaution.
145. See Timothy Garton Ash,  Anti-Europeanism in America, NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS,
February 13, 2003, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/16059.
146. See Paul Krugman, Who's Accountable, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at A27 (arguing
that the treat of WMD in Iraq was exaggerated in order to justify intervention).
147. European Environment Agency, Late Lessons from Early Warnings, supra note 22, at
13 (2002).
148. Margot Wallstrom, US and EU Environmental Policies: Converging or Diverging?,
Speech to the European Institute (April 25, 2002). Transcript available at http://europa.
eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/02/184|0|AGED&lg=EN&
display= (last visited March 4, 2003)
149. The Science and Environmental Health Network, "Frequently Asked Questions," at
http://www.sehn.org/ppfaqs.html  (last visited March 1, 2003).
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Hence it is not that the EU endorses precaution and the United
States rejects precaution.  The Bush doctrine of preemption is, in ef-
fect, precaution applied to terrorism.  It is aggressive action to pre-
empt the serious and potentially irreversible risks of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) in Iraq, despite inconclusive evidence of that
risk.  And the criticisms from Europe and elsewhere of the Bush ad-
ministration’s anticipatory war on terrorism are the same arguments
that industry makes in response to advocates of regulatory precau-
tion: the evidence is uncertain, so we should not act.  Thus the reality
is that the United States and Europe both endorse precaution, just
regarding different risks; and both criticize precaution when applied
to risks they discount.  Currently, Europe seems especially concerned
about food safety and climate change, while the United States seems
especially concerned about violence (both domestic and foreign) and
local air pollution.  Obviously, however, there is much variation
within Europe regarding precaution against terrorism and WMD in
Iraq: France, Germany, and Russia opposed such action, but Britain,
Spain, Italy, and Poland favored it.  And within the domain of risks of
terrorism and WMD, it is plausible that the United States, France,
and other countries would each make different judgments about pre-
cautionary interventions in different target countries, such as Af-
ghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and North Korea.  If so, one could not
even say that the United States favors precaution against terrorism
and France opposes it; the answer for each would depend on the con-
text of action in each target country—the risks of inaction and bene-
fits of action (weighted by the uncertainty of the evidence), the costs
of action, and the countervailing risks of action.150
One good reason for each side's worries about the other side's
precautions is that there can be real risks to precaution, whether mili-
tary or regulatory—not just financial costs, but health and safety risks
as well.  Military intervention typically causes some “collateral dam-
age” to civilians, as well as risking reprisals by those attacked.  Giving
airline pilots guns to stop terrorists may lead to inflight accident,
theft, or misuse.  As noted above, regulation also generates counter-
vailing risks.  For example, bans on genetically modified foods may
perpetuate the use of chemical pesticides and hunger in poor coun-
150. I am grateful to Bruce Jentleson for discussion of this point.  See Peter Feaver, Differ-
ent Medicines for Different Maladies, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 12, 2003, Opinion sec-
tion, at 1 (arguing that adopting different policies for dealing with Iraq and North Korea is wise
and does not reflect inconsistency or hypocrisy because the risks, benefits and costs of interven-
tion in each country differ).
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tries.  The U.S. FDA’s precautionary measures to safeguard the blood
supply against BSE may reduce the availability of blood in hospital
emergency rooms.  Forestalling climate change by shifting to fuel-
efficient diesel engines may increase local air pollution.  Every pro-
tective intervention—military, regulatory, or medical—also runs the
risk of causing new harms.151
3.  Explaining the Pattern.  Ultimately, what is interesting about
this complex pattern is not whether one society is more precautionary
or environmentalist or aggressive or morally upstanding than the
other in general, but why societies choose to worry about different
risks in particular.  Several hypotheses can be advanced to answer this
question.152  The choice of which risks to regulate may derive from
real differences in the seriousness of different risks in different places.
Or, as Oscar Wilde insinuated, it may arise from different cultures
and risk perceptions, including heuristic reactions to recent crises.153
It may turn on differences among domestic political systems and
shifting strengths of contemporary political actors, including the roles
of separation-of-powers versus parliamentary systems, third parties
(including the Greens), nongovernmental advocacy groups, and in-
dustry pressure and rent-seeking (including international trade pro-
tectionism and domestic trade rivalry).154  It may stem from different
background legal systems, including the role of tort law; the United
States may doubt the merits of precaution because it lacks Europe's
tandem principle of proportionality to confine the reach of precau-
tion, or because it has a more vigorous system than does Europe of ex
post tort liability to catch residual risks.155  Or advocacy of precaution
on the environment (and critique of precaution against terrorism)
may be on the rise in Europe as part of a move to consolidate the
power of European institutions, as against both the Member States
internally and the United States externally.156  Or it may spring from
151. See GRAHAM & WIENER, RISK VS. RISK, supra note 70.
152. For expanded discussion of these hypotheses, see Wiener & Rogers, supra note 10, at
334-42.
153. See CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES (Ortwin
Renn & Bernd Rohrmann eds. 2000); Elke U. Weber & Christopher K. Hsee,  Culture and In-
dividual Judgment and Decisionmaking, 49 APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW 32-61 (2000); MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN
ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982); Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003).
154. See Wiener & Rogers, supra note 10, at 336-37; Giandomenico Majone, The Principle
of Precaution in Politico-Institutional Context, draft of June 2003 (copy on file with the author).
155. Id. at 340-42.
156. See Christian Joerges, Law, Science And The Management Of Risks To Health At The
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changing positions in global geopolitical strategy.157
But to fit the observed complex pattern, any or all of these ex-
planations would have to predict heterogeneous policy choices in
both the United States and Europe, not a simple contrast between all
U.S. and all European policies.  Hypotheses that contrast a typical
European approach to a typical U.S. approach will be insensitive to
variations and reversals within each, and over time, yet that is what
we see occur.158  Identifying the probative explanatory variables driv-
ing the observed complex pattern of relative precaution is a prime
question for further research.159
E. Choice of Policy Instruments
In the past there had been some divergence between the United
States and Europe in the choice of policy instruments, but the future
portends increasing convergence.  Both the United States and Europe
have employed best available technology (BAT) approaches for
many years.  But the United States has made increasing use of emis-
sions trading (tradable permit) policies to deal with problems includ-
ing lead in gasoline, CFCs, acid rain, land development, and water
pollution, while Europe has not; and Europe has made greater use of
emissions taxes than has the United States.160  Of late there appears to
have been some convergence, especially as the EU has made greater
use of emissions trading—in particular to control greenhouse gas
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.161  But the United States has not
National, European And International Leve l– Stories On Baby Dummies, Mad Cows And Hormones
In Beef, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 14-20 (2001); Giandomenico Majone, What Price Safety?  The
Precautionary Principle and its Policy Implications, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 89, 107 (2002).
157. See Kagan, supra note 40: the United States and Europe “disagree about what consti-
tutes a threat . . . [they] differ most these days in their evaluation of what constitutes a tolerable
versus an intolerable threat.”
158. We see variation in relative precaution against diverse risks and over time between the
United States and the EU, within each of them, and within the member states of each.  Cf.
HOOD ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK, supra note 95 (finding variation across risk regula-
tion regimes within the UK); Vogel, Ships Passing, supra note 33 (finding variation and reversal
in relative U.S. and European precaution over time).
159. See Wiener & Rogers, supra note 10, at 334-42 (discussing and criticizing several major
explanatory possibilities).
160. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Law in the United States and the European
Community: Spillovers, Cooperation, Rivalry, Institutions, 1992 U.CHI. LEGAL F. 41, 75-80
(1993). See generally NEW INSTRUMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE EU (Jonathan
Golub ed. 1998); Jos Delbeke & Hans Bergman, Environmental Taxes and Charges in the EU in
Jonathan Golub ed., supra, at 242-260; Mikael Skou Anderson, GOVERNANCE BY GREEN
TAXES: MAKING POLLUTION PREVENTION PAY (1994).
161. Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Proposal for a Directive of the
8WIENER 09/10/03  4:14 PM
244 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 13:207
yet begun to make widespread use of emissions taxes.162
It should be noted here that the use of “economic incentives” is
not a move to favor “economic interests” over environmental inter-
ests.  In fact, industry often resists the use of taxes or emissions trad-
ing because those instruments, unlike technology standards, force in-
dustry to pay for every residual unit of emissions, either as a tax levy
or as the foregone earnings from not selling a permit.  Nor is the ad-
vocacy of “market-based instruments” based on the premise that “the
market” can solve all environmental problems; it is rather an effort to
correct what are recognized to be market failures by adopting gov-
ernment policies that reconstitute incentives in environmentally de-
sirable directions.  Moreover, the choice of instruments, such as eco-
nomic/market-based incentives, is distinct from the choice of the level
of environmental protection to be achieved.  One can employ eco-
nomic incentives to achieve quite stringent goals.
Information disclosure is an instrument that has been used more
frequently in the United States than in Europe.163  On top of its “dis-
covery” procedures in civil litigation, the United States has enacted
several powerful information policies, including the 1966 Freedom of
Information Act, the environmental impact statement requirements
of NEPA in 1969, the 1986 enactment of the national Toxics Release
Inventory and of California’s Proposition 65, and the facility accident
scenario requirements of Clean Air Act section 112r adopted in 1990.
In turn, Europe has recently been moving to bolster its information
disclosure policies through CEC Directive 1990/313/EEC on access to
information from Member States, the 1998 Aarhus Convention,
Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 on access to information
from EU institutions, the new European Pollutant Emissions Registry
created in 2000 to be operational by 2003, and the pending Draft Pro-
tocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTR) to be fi-
European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission
Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC,
COM(2001)581final, Brussels, 23 October 2001 (hereinafter CEC, Greenhouse Gas).
162. A comparison of U.S. and European instrument choice is currently being studied by a
multiauthor group convened by Winston Harrington and Richard Morgenstern at Resources for
the Future (RFF) in Washington DC; their book is forthcoming.  See also Katrina M. Wyman,
Why Regulators Turn to Tradeable Permits: A Canadian Case Study, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. (2002)
(arguing that greater cost savings, not legal culture, leads countries to use market-based incen-
tives to address particular problems—such as air pollution in the United States and fisheries
conservation in Canada—but not others—such as air pollution in Canada and fisheries conser-
vation in the United States).
163. See supra note 90; Sand, Precautionary Principle, supra note 24; Sand, Information Dis-
closure, supra note 90.
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nalized at the UN/ECE Ministerial Environmental Conference in
Kiev in 2003.164
F. Degree of Integration Across Hazards and Media
U.S. environmental regulation is highly fragmented, with many
different agencies implementing many different statutes to address
different risks.  Even within the EPA, there are separate fiefdoms for
air, water, and waste.165  This fragmentation contributes to cross-
media and cross-pollutant shifts, frustrating effective regulation.166
“Integrated pollution control” (IPC) is the effort to deal with multiple
risks more holistically, to ensure actual environmental improve-
ment.167  Since the early 1990s, the United Kingdom has made signifi-
cant efforts to adopt integrated pollution control, especially in its
1990 and 1995 Environmental Protection Acts and its creation of an
integrated pollution control agency.168  The U.K. approach has since
been borrowed by other countries in Europe and by EU institu-
tions.169  A recent review of IPC in the United States and Europe con-
cluded that “implementation of the integrated concept has proven to
be very difficult, and examples of a truly holistic multimedia permit
can rarely be found,”170 that most EU Member States had not imple-
mented the IPPC Directive in their domestic law by the 1999 dead-
line,171 but that nonetheless “the European Union is at a somewhat
164. Sand, Information Disclosure, supra note 90.  The draft PRTR Protocol to the Aarhus
Convention was adopted at Kiev on May 21, 2003, along with two other UN/ECE protocols; see
the press release at http://www.unece. org/press/pr2003/03env_p16e.htm (last visited June 11,
2003).
165. Alfred Marcus, EPA’s Organizational Structure, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5
(Autumn 1991).
166. See GRAHAM & WIENER, supra note 70.
167. Lakshman Guruswamy, The Case for Integrated Pollution Control, 54 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 (Autumn 1991); INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL (Nigel Haigh &
Irene Erwin eds. 1990).
168. Albert Weale, Environmental Regulation and Administrative Reform in Britain, in
REGULATING EUROPE 106 (Giandomenico Majone ed. 1996); Michael Purdue, Integrated Pol-
lution Control in the Environmental Protection Act 1990: A Coming of Age of Environmental
Law? 54 MOD. L. REV. 534 (1991); Neil Carter & Philip Lowe, The Establishment of a Cross-
Sector Environment Agency, in UK ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S 38 (T. Gray ed.
1995).
169. INTEGRATED POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL: THE EC DIRECTIVE FROM A
COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (Chris Backes & Gerrit Betlem eds.
1999); Johannes Zöttl, Towards Integrated Protection of the Environment in Germany? 12 J.
ENVTL. L. 281 (2000).
170. Uwe M. Erling, Approaches to Integrated Pollution Control in the United States and the
European Union, 15 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2001).
171. Id. at 40-41.
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more advanced stage” of IPC than the United States.172
G. Enforcement Mechanisms
The “styles” of U.S. and European regulation have long been
said to diverge.  The U.S. regulatory system is seen as highly legalistic
and adversarial, with a strong role for decentralized decisionmaking
in courts both in the review of regulation, and in the application of
tort law.173  U.S. regulatory authority is more fragmented than Euro-
pean regulatory authority, with multiple agencies, courts, committees,
and levels of government all having a hand in and offering opportuni-
ties for public input into policy development.174  The European regula-
tory style is seen as more cooperative, hierarchical, and centralized.175
Even when substantive standards are equivalent, procedural ap-
proaches are said to diverge significantly.176  U.S. adversarial legalism
yields greater opportunities for formal public input and transparency,
but also greater delay and antagonism; the European approach invites
more negotiation of policy development between government and
regulated businesses.177
This difference in style reflects the longstanding U.S. mistrust of
concentrated power, in both government and business.178  The United
172. Id. at 41.
173. See Kagan & Axelrad eds., supra note 64.  Centuries ago, Edmund Burke counseled the
English Parliament to let the American colonies go because they were annoyingly litigious.  See
Edmund Burke, Speech on moving His Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies, March 22,
1775, at **89-90, in SELECT WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE, AND MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS
(E.J. Payne ed. 1999) (noting that General Gage reports that “all the people in his government
are lawyers, or smatterers in law; and that in Boston they have been enabled, by successful chi-
cane, wholly to evade many parts of one of your penal capital constitutions.”)
174. Id. at 12-13.
175. See David Vogel, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1985); Jasanoff, RISK MANAGEMENT AND
POLITICAL CULTURE, supra note 27; Kagan & Axelrad eds., supra note 64, at 11-13.
176. See Kagan & Axelrad eds., supra note 64, at 3, 23.  Cf. Donald L. Horowitz, The Qu'ran
and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP.
L. 543 (1994) (observing that procedural law is often slower to converge across countries than
substantive law because practicing lawyers cling to the procedure they know).  But see Bern-
stein, supra note * (arguing that U.S. and German systems of civil procedure are hardly as di-
vergent as is typically claimed—in particular, that German civil litigation does not position the
judge as an inquisitorial actor but rather employs much the same adversarial method as does the
United States).  Kagan & Axelrad’s claim is not so much that the legal rules of civil procedure
diverge, but that the social use of litigation to solve problems diverges.
177. See Kagan & Axelrad eds., supra note 64, at 23, 404-05.
178. Id. at 10, 13; John C. Reitz, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM. J. OF COMP.
L. 437, 457 (2002); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation? 29
CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 85-86 (2001) (hereinafter Stewart, New Generation).
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States Constitution has few principles obligating government to act; it
articulates limited governmental powers and individual rights to block
the government.  Mistrust of governmental power may itself be a rea-
son for U.S. reluctance to embrace the precautionary principle, while
European legal culture may be more comfortable with principles of
obligatory regulatory action.
The U.S. reliance on courts, both to enforce regulations at the
behest of citizen suits and to award compensation to tort victims, may
also help explain the disagreement between U.S. and European offi-
cials over adoption of an overarching precautionary principle.
Knowing that the adversarial U.S. legal system would enforce such a
principle more vigorously than European law, U.S. negotiators may
resist agreeing to a principle that would seem more stringent in the
United States than elsewhere.  And knowing that the U.S. tort system
is there to remedy injuries when they occur—and thereby to deter fu-
ture injuries, U.S. officials may feel less need to adopt highly precau-
tionary ex ante regulation.  By contrast, European officials may worry
less about vigorous and rigid enforcement of precaution, while they
may feel they need it more because they lack as robust a tort system.
There are some signs of convergence regarding the style of en-
forcement.  Europe is becoming more formal and legalistic, inviting
greater participation by interest groups in policy formulation, in part
as a consequence of the integration of European institutions and the
rise of power in Brussels.179  European public trust in government and
scientists has declined in the wake of several food safety crises, in-
cluding mad cow disease, thereby prompting greater demands for
regulatory transparency and accountability.180  Meanwhile, U.S. regu-
lation is becoming less adversarial and more cooperative through the
use of regulatory negotiation, alternative compliance agreements,
habitat conservation plans, and Dutch-style environmental cove-
nants.181
H. Hierarchical Level of Government (Regulatory Federalism)
There had been divergence between the United States and
Europe on the hierarchical or vertical level of government responsi-
ble for environmental regulation: U.S. policy had moved toward a
179. See Vogel, Risk Regulation, supra note 61; Kagan & Axelrad eds., supra note 64, at 14-
15.
180. See Lofstedt & Vogel, supra note 33.
181. See Golub ed., supra note 160; but see Stewart, New Generation, supra note 178, at 85-
86 (doubting how far the U.S. will go in this direction).
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strong role for the federal government, adopting national pollution
control standards and enforcing them directly against private entities
(though federal standards are often implemented by the states).
Meanwhile, in Europe, the competency of the European Commission
to address environmental issues took time to establish, and the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity still left most standard–setting and enforcement
decisions in the hands of Member State and provincial governments.
But now there may be signs of some convergence, as the EU central-
izes toward a stronger role for the Commission in Brussels and as the
United States decentralizes toward a greater role for the states.182
IV. COMPARATIVE PRECAUTION AND EVOLUTION
A. Cautions Concerning Comparison
Comparisons of national regulatory policies confront a series of
difficulties.  Recent efforts to compare U.S. and European environ-
mental policies illustrate these pitfalls.  Some problems derive from
inadequate data collection, but others go deeper, questioning whether
such comparisons are methodologically tractable at all.
First, comparisons of national regulatory policies frequently leap
to macro–scale conclusions from just one or a few highly visible ex-
amples of conflict.  For example, claims that “European policies are
generally becoming more precautionary,” if based only on the recent
controversies over genetically modified (GM) foods and climate
change, succumb to the availability heuristic183—exaggerated attention
to salient recent crises.  They fail to study the broad array of com-
parative data upon which any such claims (in whatever direction)
ought to be based.  But even utterly objective observers may find it
methodologically vexing to test the descriptive claim that one legal
system is or is not more precautionary than the other.  We cannot
prove or disprove such broad empirical claims unless we can select
and compare a representative sample of policies from the population
of relevant regulatory actions.184  Yet drawing such a representative
182. See Breyer & Heyvaert, supra note 66; Joerges, supra note 156.
183. On the availability heuristic and its distortion of perception, see Cass R. Sunstein, Be-
yond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1008-11, 1041-44 (2003); Timor
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683-768
(1999); Howard Margolis, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS
DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1997); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Impli-
cations of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation,19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, (1990).
184. See GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL
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sample requires far more than noticing a handful of cases, such as
beef hormones or GM foods, and asserting a broad difference.  It re-
quires defining the total regulatory universe or regulatory population
from which to sample (e.g., from the environmental, health, and
safety risks, or all three; what about financial risks?), identifying the
boundaries of these populations (i.e., which specific regulatory poli-
cies do those categories embrace and exclude?), sampling from that
population without bias (which subset of regulatory policies will ap-
proximately reflect the regulatory regime?); and defining a regulatory
policy as the unit of observation (which units of policy make the
proper basis for comparison—a statute, subprovision, agency regula-
tion, court decision, enforcement action, or some combination
thereof?).  It is clear that relying on one or three cases is inadequate
to support a broad system-wide claim.  But a rebuttal based on a
larger number of contrary or mixed cases, although a good start, is
not necessarily sufficient to support the contrary system-wide claim.
Thirty cases are better than three, but both sets are incomplete and
subject to the critique that they are a skewed sample of the larger re-
ality.  It is a fair question whether comparative law can meet the crite-
ria for rigorous social science.185
Second, comparisons written from one side of the Atlantic or the
other frequently commit the comparativist’s sin of ignorance of and
even disrespect for foreign law,186 claiming, for example, that so much
has happened over here while so little has happened over there, when
the reality is hardly so one–sided.  As Herbert Bernstein pointed out,
“some American lawyers without a comparative background still suf-
fer from parochial notions about the imagined uniqueness of certain
features of their system which are not unique.”187  Herbert was criti-
cizing Americans’ claims of unique civil litigation systems, but the
same criticism can apply to lawyers from any country who tout the
system with which they are familiar and neglect the state of affairs in
the other system.  Sometimes this occurs inversely, with, say, Ameri-
cans lionizing the European system and neglecting developments
back home, or vice-versa.  It is lopsided to assert, for example, that
INQUIRY (1994).
185.  See William Blomquist, The Policy Process and Large-N Comparative Studies, in
THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 201, 221-24 (Paul A. Sabatier ed. 1999) (contending that
comparative policy analysis requires models of high complexity, dynamism and within-country
longitudinal detail that may be difficult to test with empirical data across countries).
186. John C. Reitz, How To Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 636 (1998).
187. Bernstein, supra note *, at 589.
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Europe has enacted many important environmental measures since
the 1980s while the United States has done little or has retrenched.188
The reality is that in the last two decades, while Europe indeed
adopted many important measures, the United States, spanning
Presidencies and Congresses of both major political parties, enacted
the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (including tough
new controls on older waste treatment and disposal sites) at 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901 et seq.; the 1986 Superfund Amendments (including tough
waste site cleanup standards and the pathbreaking Toxics Release In-
ventory) at 42 U.S.C. § 11001 et seq.; the 1990 Oil Pollution Act (in-
cluding new technology requirements and liability standards for oil
shipping) at 33 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.; the 1990 Clean Air Act Amend-
ments (including tight technology controls on air toxics, and the very
successful national SO2 allowance trading system for sharply reducing
acid rain) at 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act
amendments at 42 U.S.C. 300f et seq.; the 1996 Food Quality Protec-
tion Act (PL 104-170, amending the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq., and the Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.); the
1990s laws on youth violence and smoking in public places; and nu-
merous stringent agency regulations (including the 1987 Top-Down
BACT policy, the 1989 ban on British beef, the 1997 Ozone and
PM2.5 national ambient air quality standards, the 2001 standard on
arsenic in drinking water, and the 2002 and 2003 standards on diesel
engine emissions). This is not to say that all of these policies have
been desirable, nor that countries should compete to enact more laws;
nor is it to ignore differences among Presidents.  It is just to say that
U.S. regulatory inactivity is not the reality.  Likewise, there may have
been more policy action in Europe in the 1970s than is typically rec-
ognized today.  That is, after all, when the notion of precaution blos-
somed in German, Swedish, and Swiss environmental law.
Third, comparisons along one dimension, such as whether a par-
ticular principle (say, precaution) has been adopted in each legal sys-
tem, frequently neglect the surrounding context of other principles,
rules, institutions, and equivalent doctrines under other names, as
well as the distinction between the law on the books and the law in
action,189 so that the comparison falsely finds divergence when the re-
ality in toto is functional similarity.  For example, the claim that U.S.
188. See Kraemer, supra note 12.
189. See Reitz, supra note 186.
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regulation is now governed by cost-benefit analysis, while European
regulation is not, neglects several contextual facts.  To begin with, de-
spite requirements for such analysis issued by every President since
Jimmy Carter, including both Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, im-
portant areas of American regulation (such as the ambient air quality
provisions of the Clean Air Act) remain statutorily immune to cost
considerations.190  Meanwhile, European regulatory policy has also
moved to official cost–benefit or economic analysis, in the European
Commission's Communication on the Precautionary Principle,191 and
often in Member State law.192  And the “principle of proportionality”
in European law amounts to a weighing of benefits and costs, concep-
tually equivalent to cost–benefit analysis (though perhaps less fre-
quently quantitative in practice), that cabins the reach of the precau-
tionary principle.193
Fourth, broad comparisons often neglect great variations within
each legal system, such as among the EU Member States and among
the states of the United States.  In some cases that internal variation
exceeds the claimed differences across two aggregated systems.194
Fifth, broad comparisons sometimes take a snapshot of current
events but overlook dynamic changes through time, not only in the
past but also into the future.  Current events may seem to represent a
climax or ending when in fact they are part of an ongoing transition
that is difficult to perceive from within.
Sixth, and compounding the cautions stated above, may be the
phenomenon of intergroup discrimination.  This is the tendency of
group members to assert sharp contrasts between one's own group
and other groups, even when such differences are in fact minimal or
nonexistent.  Social psychologists have shown that group’s members
often assert such exaggerated intergroup contrasts even when the
group members had only moments earlier been sorted into the groups
190.  See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (holding
that cost-benefit analysis is impermissible under Clean Air Act sec. 109).
191.  See Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the Precautionary
Principle, supra note 21.
192.  Sand, Precautionary Principle, supra note 24.
193.  See NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1996); Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health S.A. v Council, 2002 WL
31337, European Court of First Instance (2002), para. 410 (“The Court considers that a
cost/benefit analysis is a particular expression of the principle of proportionality in cases in-
volving risk management.”).
194. See HOOD ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK, supra note 95 (finding great variation
across risk regulation regimes within the United Kingdom).
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at random—that is, when no such intergroup differences really exist.195
Groups sorted by ethnicity or race or nationality are even more prone
to exaggerate intergroup contrasts, claiming own-group superiority
along some dimension.196  Thus U.S. and European regulatory offi-
cials, and experts studying regulatory policy, may cite and emphasize
transatlantic contrasts that would be nearly indistinguishable to out-
side observers, or at least far less salient than the similarities between
U.S. and European regulatory policies.  This is particularly likely with
regard to relative precaution, where both the United States and
Europe must lie at the highly precautionary end of the global spec-
trum.197  Debates between the United States and Europe over who is
“more precautionary than thou” may look baffling and hairsplitting
to the billions of people who live in countries with less stringent envi-
195.  Henri Tajfel, Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination, 223 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
96-102 (1970).  A related but distinct problem occurs when groups do not just exaggerate the
stated contrasts with other groups, as Tajfel found, but actually become more polarized as they
change their preferences and distance themselves further from the other group.  See Cass R.
Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble?  Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (2000);
ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 200-245 (2d ed. 1986).  Groups become polarized in
part when arguments among like-minded group members compound each other.  Group polari-
zation might also be occurring between U.S. and European regulatory communities, but as I
argue below, the sharply stated contrasts between U.S. and European regulatory systems seem
to be more rhetorical exaggeration than actual change in position.
196. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 144-147 (2d ed. 2000).  Al-
though examples of asserted (but inaccurate) racial and ethnic difference come immediately to
mind, examples of geographic (often mixed with cultural) discrimination are also very common.
For example, residents of America’s two largest cities and their regions—New York in the
Northeast and Los Angeles in Southern California – have long engaged in a rhetorical rivalry in
which they assert sharp contrasts and demean the other place.  Social scientists, however, argue
that in fact the two places are actually very much alike, and increasingly so.  They two cities are
certainly more like each other than they are like the places in between them.  “The New York-
Los Angeles dichotomy has long infected . . . politics, culture, art and architecture, urban life.
Taking sides seems practically a condition of citizenship . . . Now a bicoastal detachment of so-
cial scientists is riding to the rescue.  . . . Partisans may be sorry to learn that . . . [u]nder scrutiny,
perceived polarities blur.  . . . Cherished assumptions about the two places turn out to be rooted
less in reality than in myth.”  Janny Scott, East Coast, West Coast, and Where the Twain Meet,
N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2003 at A29.
197. Although this seems true, one cannot assume that developing countries always have
less stringent health and environmental policies.  Singapore, for example, may have one of the
world’s most precautionary legal regimes for avoiding health and environmental risks, including
significant criminal penalties for public health infractions.  See Wayne Arnold, In Singapore,
1970s Law Becomes Weapon Against SARS, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2003, at D5 (“‘In your coun-
try [the U.S.], individual rights always take precedent [sic] over community rights.  In our coun-
try, it’s the other way around,’ said Goh Kee Tai, chief of the communicable diseases branch at
the Ministry of Health’s epidemiology and disease control division.  Singapore has a siege men-
tality about disease, much as it does about other security issues . . . The results are compelling.
 . . . Singapore's life expectancy is higher than the United States’.  Singapore is so clean that
public health officials worry that its citizens have low resistance to even mild outbreaks.”)
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ronmental standards as compared to either the United States or
Europe, less institutional capacity to enforce those standards, less sci-
entific capacity to detect and warn of remote future risks, and much
more pressing immediate crises in hunger, health, and environmental
quality.
Seventh, flaws in comparative legal analysis may render it less an
exercise in dispassionate social science than a vehicle for expressing
the author's previously reached conclusion about what kind of law is
desirable.198  Advocates of precaution may use the descriptive claim
that Europe is now more precautionary than the United States in or-
der to pressure both systems to ratchet upward their regulatory pos-
tures.  Critics of precaution may make the same descriptive claim,
that Europe is now more precautionary, in order to warn against such
a trend in the United States.
In short, the fundamental fact of comparative legal analysis is
that things are “more complicated than you thought.”199  Broad and
catchy depictions miss the true complexity and dynamism of vast and
interactive social and legal systems.  The same is true of regulatory
policy itself: seductively simple prescriptions tend to fail when tested
against the complexity of real-world systems. We need caution about
precaution, and about comparisons of national precaution.  That does
not mean, however, that we should look only at the details and never
step back to see the bigger picture; on the contrary, we must look at
both details and whole systems.  A main problem with the claimed
contrasts between U.S. and European environmental policies is that
they focus narrowly on one issue (such as the precautionary principle,
or GM foods) and neglect the broader systems (such as the propor-
tionality principle, tort law, and a broader sample of risks).  Or they
are really stories of institutional change (the growth and integration
of European Community institutions) that deploy a few concrete ex-
amples to illustrate the story, implying without really demonstrating
that the examples prove an across-the-board divergence in regulatory
policy.
198.  See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
32 (3rd ed. 1998) (counseling care in avoiding biased comparisons); Hiram E. Chodosh, Com-
paring Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1025 (1999) (criticizing com-
parative law as inadequately rigorous and subject to unstated biases); Gunter Frankenberg,
Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 411–455 (1985) (ar-
guing that neutral comparison is impossible and must give way to self-reflection).
199.  David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and Interna-
tional Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 605 (1997).
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B. Convergence, Divergence, and Hybridization
Thus, to the question whether U.S. and EU environmental poli-
cies are converging or diverging, my answer is both and neither.  U.S.
and EU environmental policies are both converging and diverging,
because the reality differs in different strata of policy development
and implementation.200  And U.S. and EU environmental policies are
neither converging nor diverging, because they are evolving simulta-
neously without a single endpoint in view for either system.
A more accurate model is one of “hybridization”: iterative ex-
change of legal ideas, tools and approaches through a process not dis-
similar to biological interbreeding among populations in nature.  Hy-
bridization involves “legal borrowing” or “legal transplantation,”201
earlier called “mimesis”202 and more generally the diffusion of social
concepts.203  The social, cultural, or legal concepts exchanged are
sometimes called “memes,”204 as an analogy to the genes or traits ex-
changed in hybridization among biological populations.  Hybridiza-
tion in nature was long thought to be of minor evolutionary signifi-
cance, but careful empirical investigations in the last few decades
have revealed its widespread and often crucial role in survival and re-
200. Accord, Margot Wallstrom, US and EU Environmental Policies: Converging or Di-
verging? Speech to the European Institute (April 25, 2002). Transcript available at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/02/184l0lAG
ED&lg=EN&display= (last visited March 4, 2003) (arguing that both are occurring).
201. Alan Watson, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed.
1993).  John Bell distinguishes transplants from “cross-fertilisation,” which he says “implies a
different, more indirect process [in which] external stimulus promotes an internal evolution
within the receiving legal system [which] involves an internal adaptation … a distinctive but or-
ganic product of that system rather than a bolt-on.”  John Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-
fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
147, 147 (Jack Beatson & Takis Tridimas eds. 1998).  My conception of hybridization is suffi-
ciently broad to encompass both transplantation and Bell’s notion of cross-fertilisation, al-
though I would have used the term “cross-fertilization,” as in biology, to connote actual genetic
transfer.  Bell seems to envision relatively discrete legal systems which can either add-on foreign
ideas (transplants) or respond internally to foreign ideas (cross-fertilisation); I envision legal
systems as more diffuse with more permeable membranes through which legal ideas are regu-
larly moving, so that both transplants and stimulus-response adaptations are forms of hybridiza-
tion.
202.  A.J. TOYNBEE, 12 A STUDY OF HISTORY: RECONSIDERATIONS 343 (1961).
203. Torsten Hägerstrand, The Diffusion of Innovations, 4 INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL SCIENCES 174 (1968).  Peter Sand used the term “interfusion.”  See Peter H. Sand, Cur-
rent Trends in African Legal Geography: The Interfusion of Legal Systems, in THE
HARMONISATION OF AFRICAN LAW 107 (1974).
204.  Richard Dawkins, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); Robert Aunger, THE ELECTRIC MEME:
A NEW THEORY OF HOW WE THINK (2002).
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production, as well as in the emergence of new species.205  In compara-
tive regulatory policy, we both observe and participate in the ex-
change of legal traits or “legal DNA”; we can both document and
shape the process.
This model of hybridization across legal systems describes one
process of evolution of law.  Much of the literature on legal evolution
has described a different evolutionary process: the evolution within a
legal system, involving the selection, refinement and replication of
one legal system’s legal rules over time.206  Another literature has fo-
cused on the exchange of legal ideas across legal systems.207  These
two literatures seem rarely to have crossed paths and interbred.208
The relative inattention among many legal scholars to hybridization
across legal systems parallels the relative inattention among many bi-
ologists, until recently, to hybridization across species.
When hybridization occurs, it can contribute to more efficient
evolution than would purely within-system selection pressures.  Ex-
change across species and across legal systems can foster success and
efficiency by offering a wider array of choices; it helps diversify the
205.  M.L. ARNOLD, NATURAL HYBRIDIZATION AND EVOLUTION (1997); Peter R. Grant,
ECOLOGY AND EVOLUTION OF DARWIN’S FINCHES (1999); Peter Grant & Rosemary Grant,
Speciation and Hybridization in Island Birds, 350 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON 765–72 (1996); DOLPH SCHLUTER, THE ECOLOGY OF ADAPTIVE
RADIATION (2000).
206.  See e.g. E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?  41 ST. LOUIS U.L.J.
595 (1997) (reviewing the literature on Law and Biology and evolution of legal systems, includ-
ing the hypothesis of efficient evolution through re-litigation of inefficient rules); E. Donald
Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985) (discussing
biological approaches to understanding legal evolution); Gillian Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution
of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 583 (1993); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in
Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996) (addressing path dependence in the evolu-
tion of legal rules over time); Paul Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 51 (1977).
207.  See ALAN WATSON, EVOLUTION OF LAW (1985) (advancing theory of legal borrowing
as a vehicle for legal change); Rudolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Com-
parative Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991); Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for
Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOL.
L.Q. 1295 (2001) (discussing horizontal and vertical legal borrowing) (hereinafter Wiener,
Something Borrowed); Esin Örücü, Law as Transposition, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 205-223
(2002).
208.  See UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 125-26 (1997) (lamenting
the mutual inattention of the theories of legal transplants in comparative law, and efficient
evolution in law and economics).  Mattei then seeks to bring these two approaches together in a
synthesis that explains legal transplants (or their failure to occur) on efficiency criteria.  Id. at
126-45.  See also Wiener, Something Borrowed, supra note 207, at 1343-62 (analyzing legal bor-
rowing in terms of the positive and normative criteria for efficient evolution of law).
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portfolio of available tools and thereby helps equip the borrower to
survive future challenges.209  Whereas within–system selection pres-
sures leave surviving those who have survived past environments (po-
tentially yielding local optima in terms of past events, but not overall
optima across all future scenarios), inter-system exchange creates hy-
brid offspring—with a more diversified portfolio of traits—that may
be better suited to surviving in the environment yet to come.210  Most
of the hybrid offspring do not prosper while the environment is sta-
ble, but when the environment changes, as it always does,211 hybrids
can become the basis for successful new species and new legal ap-
proaches.  Indeed, hybridization is an especially appropriate platform
for the evolution of environmental law because the essence of envi-
ronmental problems is interconnectedness.
Hybridization of law (or species) might look like convergence—
the generation of a new approach shared by both systems—but it
need not be.  Hybridization can imply a complex web of borrowings
of particular features applied to different problems, institutions, and
levels of government—a hodgepodge of “bricolage”212 that yields a
diffuse and cloudy pattern rather than a tight convergence to a new
line.  One might observe divergence in one area, convergence in
another—many aspects heading in different directions all at once.  Or
hybridization might give rise to a new version that is quite different
from both parental approaches and that appears during the
209.  In response to an audience question following his address on within-system legal evo-
lution, Donald Elliott did mention the advantages of a diversified portfolio of legal approaches
and, implicitly, of legal borrowing to achieve that diversification, while also seeming to be skep-
tical of such borrowing.  “Because of differences in environments, and also because of the no-
tion that there is a diversity of strategies which are being played in any population, one would
not expect the same thing that works in a particular culture to work in another context. This is
both because of the environmental differences, and as modern biology teaches us, because there
is not a single adaptive strategy. . . . A distribution of strategies is much more evolutionarily sta-
ble. So what one would expect to see, and what one does in fact see, is a variety of different so-
cieties playing a variety of different strategies on such things as, for example, security and
risk. . . . You can understand these differences in social organizations as different societies
playing different strategies, each having different advantages or disadvantages in particular
types of environments. So there is absolutely no reason to believe there is going to be a sort of
single, universal approach. But it is helpful, I think, in a comparative way, to understand what
the different functions are.”  Elliott, supra note 206, at 619-20.
210.  See Grant, supra note 205; Roe, supra note 206 (emphasizing the need to choose legal
rules to meet tomorrow's environment, not just yesterday’s environment, and the problem of
path-dependence and local optima because rules or traits that survive natural selection are the
ones that succeeded in yesterday’s environment).
211.  See Daniel Botkin, DISCORDANT HARMONIES (1992); Jonathan B. Wiener, Beyond
the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POLICY FORUM 1 (1996).
212.  Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J
1225 (1999).
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both parental approaches and that appears during the transitional
process to be divergent from both parental systems.
As a descriptive model for contemporary legal evolution, hy-
bridization seems considerably more realistic than convergence or di-
vergence.  Whereas convergence and divergence can both occur with
no interaction among the systems, hybridization necessarily involves
exchange across systems, which seems obvious in an age of globaliza-
tion and international trade.  Whereas convergence and divergence
imply curves heading toward or away from a single point (or line) on
a plane, as though legal systems had some determinate and common
starting or ending points, hybridization implies an interactive inter-
face between two particle clouds that are continuously exchanging
components across one or many planes, thereby reaching and even
creating new points on an unfolding multidimensional frontier.
Rather than two lines converging or diverging, one can envision two
fractals interacting at many junctures as they both evolve.  Whereas
models of convergence or divergence depict each legal system as a
discrete aggregate entity moving in one direction, a model of hybridi-
zation corresponds better to a view of legal systems as complex disag-
gregated multi-nodal networks, with multiple actors pursuing multiple
directions at once and interacting across permeable system bounda-
ries in many places at once.213
In order to understand U.S. and European environmental poli-
cies in this context of complexity, the Duke Center for Environmental
Solutions and the European Commission's Group of Policy Advisers
have been conducting a project on “The Reality of Precaution.”214
The project engages participants from both the United States and
Europe in order to overcome the problem of ignorance of foreign le-
gal systems.  Initial products of this effort include a series of transat-
lantic dialogue meetings and a jointly-authored research paper.215  A
central finding from this work, as described above in this article, is
that the United States and Europe are not diverging or flip–flopping,
with Europe becoming “more precautionary” than the United States
213.  Hybridization therefore comports better than do convergence or divergence with
models of the “disaggregated state” and transnational networks for exchange of ideas.  See
Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International Organiza-
tions, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 43 (1974); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183, 184.
214.  See Duke Center for Environmental Solutions, “The Reality of Precaution,” at
http://www.env.duke.edu/solutions/precaution_project.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (hereinaf-
ter Duke Project).
215.  See Wiener & Rogers, supra note 10.
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across the board.  Rather, both the United States and Europe are
taking a precautionary approach to the regulation of many risks, but
they differ on which risks they choose to worry about and regulate
most.
C. Hybridization in Action
The foregoing analysis suggests that one cannot characterize the
entirety of U.S. and European environmental policies by either con-
vergence or divergence; both are occurring, but differently in differ-
ent strata of policy development and implementation.  A more accu-
rate model to depict current dynamics is hybridization: the exchange
of legal concepts across systems.  Examples of such borrowing in risk
regulation abound.216  From the United States, Europe has borrowed
approaches to emissions trading,217 benefit-cost analysis and executive
oversight of the regulatory system,218 products liability law,219 the pro-
216. A particularly rich archeological history of legal borrowing, recounted to me by Peter
Sand (who deserves the credit for this excavation), involves the concept of “sustainable devel-
opment.”  As Sand tells the story, the concept originated in 18th century German forestry eco-
nomics.  See HANS CARL VON CARLOWITZ, SYLVICULTURA OECONOMICA (Leipzig 1713) (von
Carlowitz was a Saxon lawyer who in turn was inspired by French forest legislation, Jean-
Baptiste Colbert's “grande ordonnance” of 1669).  See book review, at http://www.ejil.
org/journal/Vol11/No4/br4.html.  It was transplanted from Germany to colonial India in the 19th
century by Sir Dietrich Brandis, a German botanist appointed Chief Inspector of Forestry by
the British.  See Phil McManus, Histories of Forestry: Ideas, Networks and Silences, 5 ENV’T &
HIST 185-208 (1999), at 192-195.  For a photo of Brandis, kept at the Forest History Society
collection at Duke library, see http://www.lib.duke.edu/forest/Biltmore_Project/Schenck_Mss_
Gallery/Detailed_Pages/FHS292thEAD.htm.  Brandis later founded the Forestry School at Ox-
ford and became the mentor of Gifford Pinchot.  Pinchot was of course appointed head of the
U.S. Forest Service by President Theodore Roosevelt, and authored THE FIGHT FOR
CONSERVATION (1910).  The transatlantic impact of Brandis is acknowledged in Gifford Pin-
chot’’s autobiographies THE TRAINING OF A FORESTER, (2d ed. London: Lippincott 1937); and
especially BREAKING NEW GROUND, 56 (1947). See also CHAR MILLER, GIFFORD PINCHOT
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN ENVIRONMENTALISM (2001); and Brian Balogh, Scientific For-
estry and the Roots of the Modern American State: Gifford Pinchot’s Path to Progressive Reform,
7 ENVTL. HIST. 198-225 (2002).  After taking root in North American conservation policy, the
sustainability concept was later introduced in the IUCN's 1980 World Conservation Policy by a
Canadian forester, David Munro.  Another prominent Canadian environmentalist, Maurice
Strong, helped to get the concept into the Brundtland Commission’s 1987 Report, Our Common
Future, and then into the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992.  See Peter
H. Sand, A Century of Green Lessons: The Contribution of Nature Conservation Regimes to
Global Governance, 1 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: POLITICS, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 58, n.70 (2001).
217. See Golub ed., supra note 160; CEC, Greenhouse Gas, supra note 161.
218. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the Precautionary
Principle, supra note 21; Commission of the European Communities, Action Plan on Improving
Regulation, supra note 59; Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Im-
pact Assessment, supra note 60.  The criteria for regulation under the Communication on the
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posed environmental liability directive,220 increasingly “federal” over-
sight of environmental policy,221 information disclosure instruments
including environmental impact assessment (EIA) and toxics release
registries,222 and other measures.  Meanwhile, from Europe, the
United States has borrowed the Dutch method of environmental
covenants and related approaches to voluntary negotiated agree-
ments,223 and the concept of precaution itself, which originated as vor-
sorgeprinzip in German law,224 and was later relied on in U.S. law.225
Additional examples of transatlantic borrowing are undoubtedly un-
derway; for example, Europe may borrow U.S. methods of judicial
review and notice and comment rulemaking,226 and the United States
may borrow from European experience with watershed manage-
ment227 and with subsidiarity.228
Hybridization is spurred by several factors.  The integrating
world economy offers greater opportunities for exchange of ideas and
counterpart experiences, while simultaneously putting pressure on na-
PP are actually quite similar to the criteria under U.S. Executive Order 12866, supra note 56.
219. See Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject, 11
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 49, 62 (1996).
220. The Commission has authored a White Paper and proposed legislation on Environ-
mental Liability; the proposed legislation is now pending in the European Parliament.  See
Commission of the European Communities, Environmental Liability Homepage, updated
March 13, 2003, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/liability/index.htm (last visited June
10, 2003).
221. See Eckard Rehbinder & Richard B. Stewart, Integration Through Law: Europe and the
American Federal Experience: Vol. 2, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY (1985); Breyer &
Heyvaert, supra note 66.
222. See Sand, Information Disclosure, supra note 90; PETER H. SAND, LESSONS LEARNED
IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 25 (1990); Wiener, Something Borrowed, supra
note 207, at 1306-07, n.35 (noting transnational borrowing of EIA requirements); Kerstin Tews
et al., The Diffusion of New Environmental Policy Instruments, 42 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL RESEARCH 569 (2003).
223. See Golub ed. supra note 160; Stewart, New Generation, supra note 178, at 85-86.
224. See Boehmer-Christiansen, supra note 14.
225. See Ethyl Corp.v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
226. See Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179;
Francesca E. Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call for
Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 451 (1999).
227. See Schomburg-Jacoby watershed plan (quoted in P. MENELL & R. STEWART,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY (1994)) (recommending borrowing of French approach to
river basin management).
228. See Vicki Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening
Up the Conversation on ‘Proportionality’ Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583
(1999) (discussing transatlantic legal borrowing of concepts in federalism); MARK TUSHNET &
VICKI JACKSON, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2000) (similar).
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tional regulators to harmonize standards.229  Transnational networks
of environmental NGOs and policy experts spread legal ideas,230 and
multinational corporations spread environmental management prac-
tices to their foreign operations.231  Further, government officials, aca-
demics, nongovernmental actors, and businesses are all engaged in a
process of learning by doing, in which successful innovations in one
place can be observed and imitated (or at least lobbied for) in other
places.
Generally speaking, in the design of risk regulatory policies,
countries do not follow simple ideologies or cultural trajectories; they
do not adopt one overarching paradigm to govern all risks.  Across
the diverse domains of risk, from food safety (including GM foods
and mad cow disease) to global atmospheric risks to violence and ter-
rorism, they select particular policy designs that are stimulated by
their contextual circumstances (including perceptions, heuristics and
culture) and shaped by their institutional criteria for judging benefits,
costs and countervailing risks in each case.232
As discussed above, hybridization is not the same as conver-
gence.  Hybridization involves exchange, and it is more complex and
dynamic than convergence or divergence.  And it may be difficult to
discern when one is in the midst of its unfolding.  Yet it offers both
229. Kagan & Axelrad eds., supra note 64, at 2-3; Bell, supra note 201, at 161 (describing
cross-fertilisation occurring when “confrontation with another system or an international legal
order provides the propitious moment for a development in national law”); DYNAMICS OF
REGULATORY CHANGE: HOW GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICIES
(David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan eds., Edited Vol. 1, 2002) at http://repositories.cdlib.org/
uciaspubs/editedvolumes/1 (surveying the effects of increasing international trade on several
regulatory domains and finding that globalization yields neither a race to the bottom nor a race
to the top but rather a variety of convergent and divergent results).
230.  See Keohane & Nye, supra note 213 (emphasizing role of transnational networks and
communities of activists and experts); Bell, supra note 201, at 162-64 (describing cross-
fertilisation via transnational networks of legal scholarship and education); TRANSATLANTIC
GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer eds. 2001);
Nicholas A. Robinson, Introduction to COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
REGULATION v, xiii (Nicholas A.  Robinson ed. April 1997).
231. See generally RONIE GARCIA-JOHNSON, EXPORTING ENVIRONMENTALISM (2000);
David L. Levy & Peter Newell, Oceans Apart?, ENV’T MAG., Nov. 2000, at 9-10, 17-18.
232. Similar arguments are made in Wiener, Something Borrowed, supra note 207 (arguing
that legal borrowing and evolution are motivated by cost-benefit criteria mediated through the
institutional framework in operation each decision); Wyman, supra note 162 (arguing that the
United States and Canada have selected market-based incentives where they yield cost savings –
and not where they don’t – rather than adhering to distinct cultures of law); and HOOD ET AL.,
supra note 95, at 171-86 (concluding that variation across risk regulation regimes within the
United Kingdom refutes the broad claims of “risk society” adherents and instead suggests that
risk regulation regimes derive from particular contextual factors).
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sides an opportunity to reduce acrimony, to study the complex reality,
and to learn from each other.  We are both observing and shaping the
evolution of our regulatory policies; we can participate in the process
of hybridization.
Climate change offers one example.  The topic is far too complex
to discuss in depth here.  But a plausible case can be made that,
judged on benefit-cost criteria, the United States should be somewhat
more precautionary than its current posture, while insisting on em-
ploying robust international emissions trading and fully global par-
ticipation.233 This path would represent a hybrid mixture of the Euro-
pean and American positions to date.
V. CONCLUSION
Criticizing an exaggerated claim of U.S. superiority in civil pro-
cedure, Herbert Bernstein wrote: “Comparative law is a means to
overcome false notions of unmatched greatness and uniqueness.
Once this is accomplished, nations can truly learn from each other.”234
The same should be said to all participants in the current debate over
relative transatlantic precaution.  As Oscar Wilde was trying to tell us
in The Canterville Ghost, it is a comic error to juxtapose European
fear of the dark with American technological hubris.  There is much
to be gained from comparative analyses, if they can be serious, re-
spectful, and open-minded.  Differences among regulatory policies
can be the source of insight rather than discord.  Our goal should be
constructive dialogue and mutual learning.
Claims that United States and European environmental policies
are converging or diverging miss the more complex—and more inter-
esting—reality.  Viewed across several strata of policy development
and implementation, there are areas of divergence (such as the rhe-
torical framing of precaution, the formality of risk assessment, and
the style of legal enforcement) and areas of convergence (such as the
substantive criteria for standard setting, the choice of policy instru-
ments, and the hierarchical level of authority).  Across the broad ar-
ray of risks, neither Europe nor the United States can claim to be
categorically more precautionary than the other across the board.
Several cases, including diesel emissions, mad cow disease, violence,
and terrorism, illustrate the simultaneous advocacy of precaution on
both sides of the Atlantic.
233. See STEWART & WIENER, supra note 76.
234. Bernstein, supra note *, at 599.
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The most striking and interesting aspect is the simultaneous con-
vergence/divergence involving precaution and the choice of particular
risks to regulate.  Viewed across the array of risks, both the United
States and Europe are precautionary about many risks (and both re-
sist precaution regarding other risks), but they repeatedly differ as to
which risks to worry about and regulate most or earliest.  Without
denying that broad principles and broad trends can and do matter, it
is at this level of the particular risk and particular policy that regula-
tion actually makes a difference and that sharp transatlantic disputes
arise.  Given the increasing integration of world markets and culture,
and the close historical association of the United States and Europe,
it is interesting that such diversity persists in the choice of which risks
to worry about and regulate.  It is this diversity in precautionary par-
ticularity, not precautionary principle, that deserves the most atten-
tion.
We are in the midst of a dynamic process of legal hybridization,
with interactive exchange of legal concepts occurring continuously.
These patterns indicate a process of mutual legal borrowing, from
which we can learn a great deal, and to which we can contribute.  Risk
and responses to it are everywhere, but they are typically studied one
at a time rather than in a comprehensive approach.  Comparative risk
regulation can move beyond the simple models of rivalry, conver-
gence, divergence, and races to the top or bottom.  These models as-
sume two discrete regulatory actors each with two options – more
precaution or less – moving linearly over time.  Instead, comparative
risk regulation can embrace the more complex model I have tried to
sketch here, with the spatial detail of multiple choice nodes in a vast
web of interlinked public and private institutions, each with a wider
option space of many different policy designs across several policy
strata, and with the temporal dynamism of legal evolution through
nonlinear hybridization.  As I have tried to do here, comparative risk
regulation can draw on the political theory of transnational linkages,
the social science of comparative policy analysis, the biological theory
of hybrid interbreeding, the mathematics of complexity, the decision
theories of choice under uncertainty and multi-dimensional conse-
quences, and the legal theories of efficient evolution and evolution
through borrowing.  Comparative risk regulation can thereby employ
interdisciplinary and integrative methods to develop a far more inter-
esting and instructive picture of precaution, of law, and of legal
change.
